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Days of demonstrations, arrests, looting, and violence followed the 2014
police shooting of Michael Brown, an African-American teenager in
Ferguson, Missouri.' Five days after the shooting, Attorney General Eric
Holder announced that the U.S. Department of Justice was investigating,
and--of particular interest for this article-said that staff members from the
Justice Department's Community Relations Service (CRS) were "on the
ground" in Ferguson to work with law enforcement and "civil and faith
leaders" to "reduce tensions." 2 Holder added that "[o]ver time, these
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learned a great deal about this topic from her book co-authors: Richard Salem, Craig
McEwen, Frank Sander, Steve Goldberg, Sarah Cole, Robert Bordone, James Coben, and
Peter Thompson. The thrust of this article was given as the Schwartz Lecture at the Ohio
State University Moritz College of Law on March 25, 2014, and reactions from the
audience contributed to the article. This article does not reflect events occurring after
2014.
' See, e.g., Julie Bosman & Alan Blinder, Midnight Curfew in Effect for Ferguson,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/17/us/ferguson-missouri-
protests.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=LedeSum&module=first-
2 Press Release, Dep't of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Statement by Attorney
General Eric Holder on Latest Developments in Ferguson, Mo. (Aug. 14, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/August/14-ag-854.html [hereinafter Attorney
General, Aug. 14, 2014]; Press Release, Dep't of Justice Office of Public Affairs,
Attorney General Statement on Latest Dev. in Federal Civil Rights Investigation in
Ferguson, Mo. (Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/August/14-ag-
873.html ("To assist on this front, the Department will be dispatching additional
representatives from the Community Relations Service, including Director Grande Lum,
to Ferguson.") [hereinafter Attorney General, Aug. 18, 2014]; Barack Obama, President,
U.S., The President Speaks on Iraq and Ferguson (Aug. 18, 2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/2014/08/18/president-speaks-iraq-
and-ferguson#transcript ("We've also had experts from the DOJ's Community Relations
Service working in Ferguson since the days after the shooting to foster conversations
among local stakeholders and reduce tensions among the community.").
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conversations [instigated by CRS intervenors] should consider the role that
increased diversity in law enforcement can play in helping to build trust
within the communities." 3 After another week of unrest,' arrests diminished,'
but law enforcement's initial responses, perhaps before CRS intervenors
developed working relationships with local officials,6 still angered parts of
the community. Some people viewed the early police responses as evidence
3
Attorney General, Aug. 14, 2014, supra note 2; Neil A. Levine, Hands Up, Don't
Shoot: A Case for the Community Relations Service, FEDERAL TIMES (Aug. 25, 2014),
http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20140825/BLG05/308250013/Hands-up-don-t-
shoot-case-Community-Relations-Service; Richard A. Serrano, Eric Holder's Trip to
Ferguson, Mo., Rooted in His Civil Rights Pledge, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2014),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ferguson-holder-20140820-story.html#page=1;
Emily Brown, Timeline: Michael Brown Shooting in Ferguson, Mo., USA TODAY (Aug.
22, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/14/michael-brown-
ferguson-missouri-timeline/14051827/; Yamiche Alcindor et al., Hundreds of Peaceful
Protesters March in Ferguson, USA TODAY (Aug. 19, 2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/14/ferguson-missouri-police-
clashes-shooting-anonymous/14046707/ (reporting that on August 14, Governor Jay
Nixon asked the head of the Missouri State Highway Patrol to take charge of the law
enforcement actions in Ferguson, and the law enforcement approach became less
confrontational regarding demonstrators); Charles Pulliam-Moore & Margaret Myers,
Timeline of Events in Ferguson, PBS NEWSHOUR, Aug. 20, 2014,
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/timeline-events-ferguson/ (August 14 report). See
also Attorney General, Aug. 18, 2014, supra note 2 (announcing on August 18 that
additional CRS staff, including the director, would go to Ferguson "to convene
stakeholders whose cooperation is critical to keeping the peace."); David Hunn, The
Justice Department's Soft Side: How One Federal Agency Hopes to Change Ferguson,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 11, 2014, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-
politics/the-justice-department-s-soft-side-how-one-federal-agency/article 591a2e64-
7ddl-5008-b300-0ab9ad8b9168.html (CRS mediators arrived a little more than a day
after the shooting).
4 Brown, supra note 3 (reporting on August 21 that the preceding night had been the
first night of "relative calm since [Michael] Brown was killed on Aug. 9.").
5 Carol D. Leonnig, David Nakamura & William Branigin, Missouri Gov. Jay Nixon
Withdraws National Guard from Ferguson, as Clashes Subside, THE WASH. POST, Aug.
21, 2014.
6 Evan McMorris-Santoro, Sanford, Florida, Mayor Urges Ferguson to Welcome
Obama Administration's Help, BUZZFEED NEWS, Aug. 20, 2014,
http://www.buzzfeed.com/evanmcsan/doj-in-ferguson#ljirioh (noting that state officials
seemed to be acting without first consulting with CRS, for example, in calling in the
National Guard); Willis Ryder Arnold, Department of Justice Representatives Stress
Communication at Friday Night Meeting, ST. LOUIS PUBLIC RADIO, Aug. 29, 2014,
http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/department-justice-representatives-stress-
communication-friday-night-meeting (CRS intervenors were in Ferguson four days
earlier).
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of contempt for African-American residents; others in the community
continued to express their support for the police.' National polling indicated a
troubling racial division in the aftermath of this incident.'
Ferguson is not unusual.' In 2012-2014, one could list community-wide
polarized conflicts in Anchorage, Alaska; Brooklyn, New York; Pueblo,
Colorado; Arlington, Texas; Waterloo, Iowa; Saginaw, Michigan-no region
of the country seemed exempt. " Some conflicts relate to police actions;
Josh Levs, Ferguson Violence: Critics Rip Police Tactics, Use of Military
Equipment, CNN, Aug. 15, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/14/us/missouri-ferguson-
police-tactics/; Elisa Crouch, Michael Brown Laid to Rest with Recollections and Calls to
Action, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/
local/metro/michael-brown-laid-to-rest-with-recollections-and-calls-to/article a62a9b90-
0910-5b34-bl87-170c35cfa4be.html; Ferguson Videos: Interviews, Rallies and More,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.stItoday.com/news/multimedia/
ferguson-videos-interviews-rallies-and-more/html_4e061015-9755-5586-af69-
cI lbf6b4el9a.html ("protesters support officer Darren Wilson").
I Tanzina Vega & Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Shows Broad Divisions Amid Missouri
Turmoil, Stark Racial Divisions in Reactions to Ferguson Police Shooting, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/22/us/on-ferguson-unrest-poll-shows-
sharp-racial-divide.html?_r-0_("An overwhelming majority of blacks say they think that,
generally, the police are more likely to use deadly force against a black person; a majority
of whites say race is not a factor in a police officer's decision to use force."); Stark Racial
Divisions in Reactions to Ferguson Police Shooting, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Aug. 18,
2014) ("By about four-to-one (80% to 18%), African Americans say the shootings in
Ferguson raise important issues about race that merit discussion. By contrast, whites, by
47% to 37%, say the issue of race is getting more attention than it deserves.").
9 CRS reports 317 "administration of justice" interventions in Fiscal Year 2013, 36
over "excessive use of force/police misconduct." U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNITY RELATIONS SERVICE ANNUAL REPORT 2013 22, 31-32, 38, 40, 45, 48, 52, 58
(2014) (hereinafter 2013 CRS A.NAL REPORT).
'0 CRS's 2013 fiscal year report cited police use of force issues in Pueblo, Colorado;
Brooklyn, New York; Laurel, Maryland; Saginaw, Michigan; Arlington, Texas;
Waterloo, Iowa; Coralville, Iowa; Anchorage, Alaska; and New Bedford, Massachusetts.
Id See also infra text accompanying notes 26-34, 145-152, 201-207, 228-235; JAMES S.
COLEMAN, COMMUNITY CONFLICT 2 (1957) ("Controversies within communities are as
old as civilization itself . . . ."); Kami Chavis Simmons, Ferguson Events Highlight
Continued Tensions Between Police and Poor Urban Residents, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug.
19, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kami-chavis-simmons/ferguson-events-
highlight b_5692699.html (In Ohio alone, police killings of African-American residents
spurred demonstrations in four cities between 2001 and 2014, one involving rioting);
Crowd Holds Vigil, Marches Downtown for Shooting Victim, THE LIMA NEWS (Aug. 23,
2013), http://www.limaohio.com/news/localnews/article_45bl 5 fbd-d65c-5902-9167-
6ebbed4c6f05.html#.U aKJUtW3eM; Christopher Maag, Police Shooting of Mother and
Infant Exposes a City's Racial Tension, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/30/us/301ima.html?_r-; Jane Predergast, 2001 Riots
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others involve environmental concerns about land use and legalization of
abortion, to name a few examples." Regardless of the subject of the conflict,
it seems that a shocking-often-tragic-incident ignites existing divisions
within a community. The trigger incident may provoke some to demonstrate
and others to destroy property or use weapons. As conflict escalates, not only
do people differ on the issue, but they also develop contempt for the contrary
viewpoint and the tactics that the "other group" is employing. Increasingly,
people are not listening to opposing arguments. The antagonists have become
polarized. 12 Public officials restore outward order, but the unrest and
Led to Top-Down Change for Cincinnati Police, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Apr. 3,
2011) http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-04-03-cincinnati-riots-
anniversaryN.htm; Connie Bloom, Marchers Return to City Hall, Protesters Resume
Call for Investigation of Police Shooting, Chiefs Resignation, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL
(Sept. 16, 2008), http://www.ohio.com/news/marchers-retum-to-city-hall-1.106596; Nick
Brennan, Hundreds Protest Police Shooting at Ohio Walmart, UPPER MICHIGAN SOURCE
(Aug. 30, 2014), http://www.uppermichiganssource.com/news/story.aspx?id=1090531#
.VEWDpkvjveM.
" 2013 CRS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 23. See infra text accompanying
notes 12, 201-07. See COLEMAN, supra note 10, at 4-5 (examples historically).
12 This article uses the term "polarized conflict" to mean conflict in which portions
of the community consider themselves antagonists and have stopped listening to the
views of other portions. See COLEMAN, supra note 10, at 11 (noting that in polarization,
"[p]eople break off long-standing relationships, stop speaking to former friends who have
been drawn to the opposition, but proliferate their associations with fellow-partisans.").
People disagree about what is counter-productive, a matter discussed further infra in Part
III.A. Others refer to similar sorts of conflicts as public policy disputes, identity group-
based conflicts, protracted social conflicts, intractable conflicts, enduring rivalries, or
factions. See, e.g., SUSAN L. PODZIBA, CIvic FUSION: MEDIATING POLARIZED PUBLIC
DISPUTES 75-96 (2012) ("public policy disputes") (regarding conflict surrounding
legalization of abortion and other conflicts); Jay Rothman & Michal Alberstein,
Individuals, Groups and Intergroups: Theorizing about the Role ofIdentity in Conflict
and Its Creative Engagement, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 631, 635-636 (2013)
("identity group-based conflicts") ("[W]e view identity as a distinct set of core concerns
determined by group loyalties, social ideologies, and identification with specific social
narratives and history and particular expressions of culture."); EDWARD E. AZAR, THE
MANAGEMENT OF PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICTS: THEORY AND CASES (1990)
("protracted social conflicts"); CHESTER A. CROCKER ET AL, TAMING INTRACTABLE
CONFLICTS: MEDIATION IN THE HARDEST CASES (2004) ("intractable conflicts"); Jacob
Bercovitch, Mediation in the Most Resistant Cases, in GRASPING THE NETTLE:
ANALYZING CASES OF INTRACTABLE CONFLICT (CHESTER A. Crocker et al. eds., 2005)
("intractable conflicts"); PAUL F. DIEHL AND GARY GOERTZ, WAR AND PEACE IN
INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY (2000) ("enduring rivalries"); THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James
Madison) ("factions") (Madison noted that factions arise from a variety of distinctions,
not limited to religion, views of government, and attachments to persons vying for power,
and have "divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and
176
[Vol. 30:2 20151
WHEN CONFLICTS POLARIZE COMMUNITIES
governmental response may deepen the bitterness between antagonistic
groups. Afterward, the disagreements may not be channeled into a process
through which decisions can be made about what long-term changes are
warranted.
This article suggests that officials change this all-too-common story by
developing public offices of "intervenors" (a word used throughout the
article for simplicity instead of public policy mediators, conciliators,
peacemakers, and a variety of other terms in use).1 3 These offices might be at
rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to cooperate for
their common good."). 2012-2014 popularized the term "polarization" to deal with
widespread and potentially destructive antagonism - whether within a community or
within political institutions, such as Congress. Drew Desilver, Partisan Polarization in
Congress and Among Public, Is Greater than Ever, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (2013),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/07/17/partisan-polarization-in-congress-and-
among-public-is-greater-than-ever/. Interest in community polarization may have been
enhanced by fever-pitch concern about political polarization more generally. THOMAS E.
MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT'S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS 101 (2013) ("The
single-minded focus on scoring political points over solving problems, escalating over the
last several decades, has reached a level of such intensity and bitterness that the
government seems incapable of taking and sustaining public decisions responsive to the
existential challenges facing the country."); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, THE
SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE: WHY GOVERNING DEMANDS IT AND CAMPAIGNING UNDERMINES
IT 3-4 (2012) ("Compromises are difficult for many reasons, including increased political
polarization and the escalating influence of money in democratic politics.").
" As used here, intervenors assess the situation and engage those within the
community in processes leading to consensus, greater understanding, and other goals.
The intervenor may resemble a mediator when the intervenor shuttles among
stakeholders. But intervenors may perform additional tasks-create new collaborative
processes, educate, engage experts, set up rumor control centers, and much more,
including such unusual activities as running into the midst of a mob attacking an
individual to reason with the people long enough to permit its victim to slip away. Susan
Carpenter, Choosing Appropriate Consensus Building Techniques and Strategies, in THE
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT
61, 62-82 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter Carpenter, 1999]; J.
MICHAEL GREIG & PAUL F. DIEHL, INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION 6-18 (2012). Others call
them public policy mediators, civil rights mediators, conciliators, conciliation specialists,
facilitators, or peacemakers. See, e.g., BERTRAM J. LEVINE, RESOLVING RACIAL
CONFLICT: THE COMMUNITY RELATIONS SERVICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1964-1989 24, 167
(2005) (conciliators); COMMUNITY RELATIONS SERVICE, http://www.justice.gov/crs (last
visited Feb. 23, 2015) (peacemakers, conciliators); 2013 CRS ANNUAL REPORT, supra,
note 9, at 9, 11 (conciliation specialists, facilitators); PODZIBA, supra, note 12, at 75-96
(public policy mediators); James Laue & Gerald Cormick, The Ethics of Intervention in
Community Disputes, in THE ETHICS OF SOCIAL INTERVENTION 205, 208, 212 (Gordon
Bermant et al. eds., 1974) (intervenor, mediator); Civil Rights Mediation Oral History
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the state, regional, or local level depending on leaders' interest in
establishing the offices as well as whether the population and conflict type or
level would give intervenors enough to do. The offices of intervenors would
not replace the vital and tough role played by law enforcement in keeping
order and by other public officials in responding to demonstrators' concerns.
But this article suggests that intervenors-if institutionalized effectively-
can often stop the conflict from escalating and add the critical dimension of
getting people in polarized communities to deliberate about ways to solve, or
at least ameliorate, the problems underlying their differences.
These suggested state or local intervenors would augment not only the
roles currently played by local public officials but also the work of the highly
respected Community Relations Service of the U.S. Justice Department. 14
Established by the Civil Rights Act of 1964," CRS employs about sixty
people, thirty-five of whom intervene in volatile local conflicts like the one
in Ferguson, Missouri involving civil rights or hate crimes issues." Given
their high quality and experience, why not simply rely on CRS intervenors to
deal with polarized community conflicts?
Part I explains that localized versions of CRS can improve results as they
guide the crucial first responses by police and local officials, speed
acceptance of CRS intervenors, shoulder some of the burden, and intervene
in conflicts that CRS cannot handle. After CRS intervenors leave, these local
intervenors can also follow up to increase understanding across groups and
build consensus on what to do about the issues that have polarized the
community. The local intervenors can do preventive work as well.
Institutionalizing an intervention capacity at the state or local level requires
more than money though, in part because of the ways that experienced
intervenors work.
Part II discusses the eclectic and nimble approaches that intervenors
employ in the midst of volatile conflict. An intervenor in these contexts is not
''your usual" mediator.
Part III suggests ways to deal with the challenges that these wide-ranging
intervenor activities create for those designing a public intervenor office. It
also discusses another challenge for designers: intervenors must strike a
Project (1999), CIVIL RIGHTS MEDIATION, http://www.civilrightsmediation.org (last
visited Feb. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Oral History Project] (civil rights mediators).
14 See, e.g., 2013 CRS ANNUAL REPORT, supra, note 9, at 3-5 (reporting that the
Association for Conflict Resolution gave its 2013 Peacemaker Award to CRS); Hunn,
supra note 3; Levine, supra note 3; McMorris-Santoro, supra note 6.
1" 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000g (2015); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-84, §4707.
" See infra text accompanying notes 45-47.
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balance between getting out of the way of constructive conflict and helping
to de-escalate destructive conflict (and determine which is which). After all,
providing state or local capacity to intervene does not diminish the
importance of getting the basic public decisionmaking right-providing
equal justice, for example-and should not undermine the constructive role
that conflict can play in achieving that goal." Conflict can offer those who
care deeply about an issue a means to pressure others to address it. "
Conflicts between groups can sharpen issues for democratic
decisionmaking.1 9 Because of these complex public policy considerations,
who decides whether and how to intervene matters.
CRS's 50-year history provides a fertile source of ideas for state and
local officials dealing with these design challenges-such as that of striking a
balance between encouraging constructive conflict and defusing destructive
conflict-that are unique to intervening in polarized conflict, and the article
draws on that history.20 Unfortunately, the CRS model does not translate
perfectly to the state and local level. In other words, CRS represents the gold
standard but not the silver bullet for institutionalizing state and local
equivalents.
To guide those designing the state and local versions of CRS, this article
suggests an approach that can be ready "off the shelf' for those moments
when a state or local government decides to fund intervention in polarized
conflict. Something "off the shelf' seems especially appropriate because
state and local governments seem to fund intervenors intermittently.2 These
offices, as a consequence, are often new to the task. Those designing them
may make mistakes due to lack of experience.22 Also, the institutional home
may not be the ideal one-just the public agency headed by a leader willing
1 See infra Part III.A. Craig Zelizer, Preface to, in INTEGRATED PEACEBUILDING:
INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO TRANSFORMING CONFLICT xi, xii (Craig Zelizer ed., 2013);
SUSAN L. CARPENTER & W.J.D. KENNEDY, MANAGING PUBLIC DISPUTES: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS, AND CITIZENS' GROUPS 3-4 (1988).
18 See infra Part III.A. Zelizer, supra note 17, at xii; CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra
note 17, at 3-4.
19 CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 17, at 3-4.
20 See generally LEVINE, supra note 13, at 21-44, 226-244 (reviewing the decision-
making on these points as CRS developed).
21 See infra text accompanying notes 228-235, 269. See COLEMAN, supra note 10, at
2 (discussing periods prior to the start of the CRS and noting that communities seemed to
handle polarizing conflict using a "trial and error process").
22 COLEMAN, supra note 10, at 2 ("Since controversy arising out of a particular kind
of crisis is not likely to occur frequently in a community, each community has little
opportunity to evolve, in a number of trials, the optimal procedures for handling
disagreements.").
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to build the capacity to intervene in polarized community conflicts.23 Added
to these challenges, the agency may be forced to act quickly in response to
crises, with little time to consider the optimal structure. To facilitate this
constant invention and reinvention of an office of intervenors, the article
poses three questions that take into account broad experiences with
institutionalizing intervenors and that can be raised regardless of the size,
level of government, and institutional placement of the localized intervenors.
These "off-the-shelf' questions reflect the policy and practice issues unique
to intervening in polarized community conflicts:
A. the difficulty of taking into account both strategy concerns and the
public interest in decisionmaking about whether, how deeply, and when to
intervene;
B. the tensions between creating a supportive climate and culture for
intervenors and making the intervenors accountable to the public funder; and
C. the often-competing aims of developing the potential participants'
trust in the intervention and intervenor, protecting the public agency's other
roles, and finding the needed range of resources.
I. SANFORD, FLORIDA AND MORE: ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE
VALUE OF LOCAL INTERVENORS
One only need to look back a year to find a story that contrasts with that
of Ferguson, Missouri and illustrates the value of using local collaborative
dispute resolution capacity to augment a federal intervention by the U.S.
Department of Justice's Community Relations Service (CRS). 24 Rival
demonstrations in Sanford, Florida, in 2012-2013 followed decisions
regarding whether to arrest, prosecute, and convict the neighborhood watch
volunteer who killed Trayvon Martin, an African-American teenager, as he
walked back with a snack from a convenience store." Told through the eyes
of Andrew Thomas, a local official who intervened in the aftermath of the
Trayvon Martin shooting, the story below illustrates the range of the local
intervenor's activities and gives the reader a sense of why they mattered.26
23 See infra text accompanying notes 107-18.
24 See infra text accompanying notes 50-61.
25 See infra text accompanying notes 26-34.
26 Telephone interview with Andrew Thomas, (January 30, 2014); Email from
Andrew Thomas, to author (March 13, 2014, 5:03 p.m.) (on file with author).
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The history of the City of Sanford in central Florida left many of its
African-American residents distrustful of the police in particular and of city
and state officials in general. Residents of west Sanford, an area that once
was the historically African-American city of Goldsboro, resented what they
believed to be an effort by Sanford and Florida a century ago to dissolve
Goldsboro's incorporation so that Sanford could take over the area. 2 Some
of these residents believed that Sanford officials discriminated in provision of
services to the former Goldsboro area. They also believed that the police
took violence less seriously when the victim was African-American.2 8
Concerned about the divide among residents and alienation from their
government, the city manager, a trained mediator, called upon Andrew
Thomas, senior project manager in the City Manager's Office. Thomas had
moved to Florida after his retirement, having mediated hundreds of conflicts
and directed the Rochester, New York Center for Dispute Settlement for 26
years. Thomas started work in Sanford in 2010 as coordinator of the
community development block grants program. Thomas also focused on the
divide among residents, placing a high priority on building a trusting
relationship with law enforcement.
In 2012 George Zimmerman, a neighborhood watch volunteer, shot and
killed Trayvon Martin. Some doubted that police and prosecutors would
move aggressively to investigate and prosecute, if prosecution was
warranted, because the teenager was African-American and the shooter was
not. When the Sanford Police Department did not immediately arrest George
Zimmerman, a group of African-American residents issued demands related
both to the arrest and prosecution of Zimmerman and to their concerns about
broader racial injustice within Sanford. Once the state appointed a special
prosecutor, and the prosecution of Zimmerman began, the legal system's
response to the shooting moved to the prosecutor's and court's domains.
Some city officials spoke optimistically about resolving the concerns
about and moving past what they viewed as a single incident, but Andrew
Thomas had a different view. Thomas had been talking with African-
American residents in the former Goldsboro area and understood their deep
convictions about injustice more broadly in Sanford. The issues would have
to be shaped over time, and they would be broader than Zimmerman's
shooting of Trayvon Martin. Moreover, having worked in polarized
27 Id.; Students Find Treasure in Goldsboro, 14 SANFORD HIST, Soc'Y NEWSL. May-
June 2007, at 1, 4, http://sanfordhistory.tripod.com/newsletters/may2007.pdf See
generally GOLDSBORO MUSEUM, http://www.goldsboromuseum.com.
28 Cara Buckley, Police Chief in Florida Tries to Ease Old Tensions, N.Y. TIMES
(June 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/17/us/in-city-of-zimmerman-trial-
police-chief-navigates-race-relations.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
181
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
situations before, Thomas predicted that national groups of various kinds
and media would arrive within days and would assert additional demands
and viewpoints. These groups would sometimes attract crowds and
sometimes seek confrontation.
Thomas had no authority to decide how Sanford would act. Though he
already knew city officials, Thomas needed to persuade them to take his
counsel seriously on these new issues. He advised city officials to talk with
counterparts in communities where similar incidents had occurred so that
they could better assess the likely course of events in Sanford. As a result,
Sanford officials recognized that Sanford could face disruption, costs, and
potentially violence, and that they should not wait to intervene in the
unfolding events, even though doing so would require-at least in the near
term-enormous resources and changes in the ways that they conducted
business. They would have to develop a unique approach-responsive to the
issues in Sanford. Thomas explained later, "There is no cookie cutter" for
dealing with polarized conflicts like the one in Sanford in 2012.
Because many African-American residents distrusted the city officials,
city officials asked the Community Relations Service at the U.S. Department
ofJustice to send mediators to improve relationships across the communities
within Sanford. 29 If CRS mediators succeeded, that would give some
resilience to the community in the coming months as national media and
national groups arrived and might ultimately make it possible to have a
cross-community dialogue about the issues that divided the city's residents.
CRS recognized the potential for serious consequences in Sanford and sent
mediators from a number of regional offices. Sanford and CRS officials
agreed that CRS would first build relationships among the clergy in Sanford;
the clergy after all cared about a peaceful resolution, and people from a
variety of Sanford's communities trusted their pastors.30
29 Arelis R. Hernandez, DOJ 'Peacemakers' Helped Sanford Stay Cool Amid Rising
Tensions, ORLANDO SENTINEL, April 15, 2012 LEXIS, News Library, (quoting the
president of the Seminole County NAACP chapter regarding CRS mediators, "'People
are more relaxed and satisfied when they know they have someone from the outside, like
the DOJ who have no ties to the community to try and relax the emotions."'); Audra D.S.
Burch, Federal Mediator Thomas Battles Serves as Peacemaker in Sanford, MIAMI
HERALD, July 5, 2013, LEXIS, News Library.
30 Profiles in ADR: Grande Lum, 20 DisP. RESOL MAG. 41, 42 (2013-2014)
[hereinafter Profiles in ADR] (noting also CRS's role in coordinating responses to three
demonstrations and a sit-in, rumor control, a sit-in, and police training). See Burch, supra
note 29 ("Among his first tasks: [CRS mediator Thomas] Battles rallied about 70 or 80
Sanford-area ministers-of varying races and faiths-and talked to the group about the
role they should play in bringing peace back to the city. 'The idea was to bring different
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Building the residents' trust toward their city officials presented another
challenge. With advice from Thomas, city officials decided to be aggressively
open in their actions and to be welcoming to residents or outsiders alike. For
example, rather than close people out of a pivotal City Council meeting on
March 26, 2012, just weeks after the incident, they moved the meeting to a
large arena and put up giant screens in the park for the overflow audience.
The city needed a means to control rumors. By the time Zimmerman's
trial occurred in 2013, the local clergy had formed an association, Sanford
Pastors Connecting, that met regularly, 31 and the Sanford Police
Department, CRS, and the County Sheriff's Office reserved seats in the
courtroom that could be rotated among members of that association. The
pastors could provide information to members that would be trusted
In time, Thomas helped facilitate conversations about changes in
Sanford. The community would remain divided until residents believed that
the police would act justly toward all residents. A community-wide citizen
group conducted a review of the police department. In response to that
group's report, the department began making changes, reporting progress
publicly every few months. 32 For the first time in memory, residents
participated in a significant way in the choice of a new police chief Regular
discussions began about other changes in Sanford.3 3 Thomas recalled that it
was challenging to make progress in these talks because public meetings
laws required them to allow media coverage, but they made progress
nonetheless.
In the meantime, local and outside groups continued to organize events.
Anticipating this, local officials and residents had decided how to respond.
They met outsiders who arrived in the city, and welcomed them. At rallies
organized by national organizations, with busloads ofparticipants coming in
from around the state, the city provided ground transportation for the elderly
and others who could not walk to the site.
Crowds sometimes swelled to 35,000 in this community of 55,000.
Thomas and CRS mediators mixed in with the crowds. When outside groups
marched to the stage of the event to provoke a confrontation, the local
participants were ready. They yielded the stage to avoid the confrontation.
kinds of people into the same room and get them to talk,' said Rev. Charles Holt, of St
Peter's Episcopal Church in neighboring Lake Mary.").
" Burch, supra note 29.
32 See discussion of progress in Sanford Takes Precautions Ahead of Zimmerman
Verdict, NPR (July 12, 2013), http://hereandnow.wbur.org/2013/07/12/zimmerman-
verdict-precautions.
* Police asked CRS to conduct trainings. 2013 CRS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9,
at 42-43.
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In time, CRS resources had to be used elsewhere so more of the burden
fell on Sanford officials. Law enforcement costs increased dramatically
during this period When various groups' demands were presented to
Sanford officials, they offered to discuss them, and sometimes made changes.
Sanford hired a public relations firm so that the city could respond to media
requests in a timely way.
No violence occurred in Sanford during these demonstrations. Sanford's
police made no arrests. Local talks continue, and Thomas sees people talking
with each other who would not have done so a few years ago. The police
continue to change. Residents remain engaged Thomas expects that it will
take more time, though he says that, increasingly, people are proud to be
Sanford residents.
The story indicates what Andrew Thomas added to the mix. First,
Thomas could guide the Sanford officials, who knew and trusted him and
therefore would listen, to optimize their crucial first reactions when unrest
erupted.34 This capacity to get involved immediately may matter less when
communities have advanced warning of major disturbances, as in the 1970s
when a court would announce that it would implement school desegregation
measures in a subsequent year, but can be critically important in conflicts
like that in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014.35 Sociologist James Coleman, in his
noted study of community conflicts, pointed to the advantage of having the
public view its officials as a possible resource for resolution, rather than as
antagonists-and these officials' first reactions may determine that. 6
Second, Thomas helped local officials understand the need to work with
CRS and invest heavily in activities that would provide clear information,
engage groups (whether Sanford residents or not) who complained, and
develop processes for people to collaborate on improving law enforcement.3
Not all state and city officials welcome CRS.38 CRS Director Grande Lum
notes that CRS' "ability to be effective is directly related to the degree of
trust that [CRS] can establish with local leaders." 3 9 Someone like Andrew
Thomas, whom Sanford leadership and local police already trusted, can
34 See supra text accompanying notes 26-33.
3 See supra text accompanying notes 1-8.
36 COLEMAN, supra note 10, at 14-17.
3 McMorris-Santoro, supra note 6 ("The part-time mayor of the Florida town, he
said his government wasn't equipped to deal with the influx of protesters and national
scrutiny following the shooting of Martin. CRS and the Justice Department gave him the
tools-and contacts-his team needed to create a dialogue with protest leaders.").
38 LEVINE, supra note 13, at 49-67 (the 1964-65 Selma, Alabama civil rights
marches); see infra text accompanying notes 64-66.
3 Profiles in ADR, supra note 30.
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hasten CRS acceptance in situations in which every hour counts.4 0 For
example, a reporter covering Ferguson, Missouri said that Missouri's
leadership "appeared wary of federal involvement," pointing out that the
Governor did not inform federal officials "before ordering the National
Guard to engage." 4 1 He reported that Sanford's mayor urged Ferguson
officials to embrace the help of CRS, crediting its intervenors for the relative
calm in Sanford.4 2
Third, Thomas continues his involvement with Sanford officials and
police, whereas CRS will return only as resources permit. As Sanford
officials change, Thomas can advise the new officials. In addition to their
contributions at the beginning of a CRS intervention, local intervenors play a
critical role at the end. Lum explains, "[S]ustainable change is much more
likely and longer lasting when local dispute resolution institutions are in
place to provide direct intervention, continuity, monitoring and prevention
services."43
Fourth, a somewhat larger CRS, one four times the current size, would
probably still have to prioritize among local conflicts as well as needs for
conflict prevention, leaving some communities largely unserved or served
only for short periods.44 CRS handled 728 cases in fiscal year 2012 with 61
staff members (35 of whom do intervention work).45 A CRS mediator who
served during periods when CRS had more staff 46 (the staff once reached
40 See text accompanying notes 26-34.
41 McMorris-Santoro, supra note 6.
42 Id. ("'These guys [Justice Department advisers] have been there, done it, they're
very astute,' Triplett said. 'We on the city side, we fix roads. We make sure your lights
turn off and on. We make sure your toilets flush. We cut ribbons for new businesses. So
you've got to rely on those that know."').
43 Email from Grande Lum, to author (March 19, 2014, 8:55 a.m.) (on file with
author) ("The legislative mandate calls for CRS to support local and state officials in
resolving disputes and reducing tension and that's how it works best. While CRS often
plays a first responder and intervention role, we have found that sustainable change is
much more likely and longer lasting when local dispute resolution institutions are in
place to provide direct intervention, continuity, monitoring and prevention services.").
44 LEVINE, supra note 13, at 240 ("Among CRS's case selection criteria, problems
involving violence or the threat of violence were accorded first priority. After that, high
value was placed on case objectives that held out the hope for influencing long-lasting
change. However, such objectives were time-consuming and successful outcomes were
by no means assured. They were a luxury CRS often could not afford.").
45 COMMUNITY RELATIONS SERVICE FY 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2013) [hereinafter
2012 CRS Annual Report]; Grande Lum, Lawrence Lecture at the Ohio State University
Moritz College of Law (September 30, 2014).
46 LEVINE, supra note 13, at 97 (During President Richard Nixon's first term, CRS
staff reached 323, though not all staff members were intervenors).
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323 persons) recalled that the answer to how long CRS could remain
involved still required prioritization and depended on a number of factors:
Depends on what else is on the plate, how critical other
things are in relationship to that. Whether you have the
resources or have done all that you can do in relationship to
it. But most of the times its priorities. When this particular
case reaches the stage where it is no longer the major
priority- there's one that is more volatile and more
demanding that you must turn your meager resources to-
then you politely and respectfully begin to ease out of the
first case.47
Of course, if CRS expands to thousands of employees-such that it could
quickly reach virtually every polarized community conflict and remain in
contact with the community between conflicts-in some situations CRS
might substitute for the localized version that this article advocates.
Fifth, and a reason even an expanded CRS might not obviate the need for
localized intervenors, CRS cannot intervene in all polarized community
conflicts without a change in law. By statute, CRS has a limited scope,
intervening only in civil rights conflicts or hate crimes.48 Some polarized
community conflicts discussed later in this article (e.g., grazing rights, water
rights)49 may fall outside its current limits.
Though local intervenors like Thomas augment its work for the five
reasons just mentioned, CRS can make a positive difference even without a
state or local intervenor, if local officials support and continue its work and
47 Oral History Project, supra note 13: Ozell Sutton (noting also the attempts to leave
in place a local structure to deal with the matter over the long term).
48 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000g-1 (2015) ("resolving disputes, disagreements, or difficulties
relating to discriminatory practices based on race, color, or national origin which impair
the rights of persons"); Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 4707 (extending CRS jurisdiction to hate
crimes "because of the actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual
orientation, gender identity, or disability of any person"). Deputy Attorney General James
M. Cole said that, "the Community Relations Service [also] serves the critical function of
allowing the Department to be proactive-to improve understanding and improve
relations before [hate crime violence related to gender identity and expression] incidents
occur. CRS also plays a critical role in the aftermath of unfortunate events, by working to
prevent additional violence by training and educating those on the ground in communities
affected by anti-transgender hate crimes." James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General,
Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole Delivers Remarks at the Community Relations
Service Transgender Law Enforcement Training Launch, 2014 WL 1247021 (Mar. 27,
2014).
49 See infra text accompanying notes 201-07; 228-35.
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its resources permit. To illustrate this, it is necessary to go back in history,
because, for confidentiality reasons, CRS rarely discloses the details of its
recent intervention work. One such example comes from Detroit in 1975
when CRS sent intervenors more than a year ahead of the court-ordered
deadline for Detroit to desegregate its schools." Well aware of the violence
that court-ordered school desegregation triggered in Boston, the court asked
CRS to come, and Detroit officials welcomed CRS help." CRS intervenors
reviewed what had occurred after implementation of federal court school
desegregation orders in other cities. 52 Based on that review and local
discussions, CRS intervenors met with over a hundred community leaders,
including leaders of groups opposed to integration, to make certain that their
voices were heard and to discuss with them ways that they might respond or
help. Intervenors trained hundreds of volunteers.54 They consulted with the
federal judge about his formation of a blue-ribbon monitoring commission. 5
They held briefings for media representatives.56 Noting the role of school
discipline problems post-desegregation elsewhere, CRS intervenors worked
with school officials to develop fair student conduct standards and train those
who would administer the discipline." They counseled police to form a
special task force in advance of the implementation, and CRS helped to train
the task force officers." They set up a communication system to deal with
rumor control. ' When busing began, CRS-trained volunteers stood at
schools and bus stops throughout the city, in radio communication.60 By the
third day of desegregation, class attendance was normal, and Detroit's
5oBradley v. Milliken, 402 F.Supp. 1096, 1132-47 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (issuing relief
but noting that it had earlier in the year made findings that relief would be necessary);
LEVINE, supra note 13, at 170-73. See also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 269-77
(1977) (reviewing the history of the Detroit school desegregation litigation, including the
1975 court order).
5 Bradley v. Milliken, 426 F.Supp. 929, 937 (E.D. Mich. 1977) ("[B]efore the
hearings on the remedial phase of this litigation began, we requested the Community
Relations Service of the United States Department of Justice to assist the City of Detroit
and the court in achieving the harmonious implementation of the court-ordered
desegregation plan for the Detroit city schools (Order, Apr. 30, 1975)."); LEVINE, supra
note 13, at 170-73.
52 LEVINE, supra note 13, at 170-73.
5 Id.
54
55 Id.
56 d
57 Id
58 Id.
5 9 Id.
60 Id.
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leaders acknowledged that the CRS-instigated preparation had helped avoid
the unrest that had rocked Boston's school desegregation (several months of
violence within schools, stoning of buses, and low school attendance).' In
this example, local officials immediately welcomed federal help, and they
had months to prepare for implementation-two aspects of the Detroit
situation that reduced the need for local intervenors.
In sum, despite CRS's documented contributions even when acting
largely without local intervenors, state and local communities cannot rely on
CRS to help with all of their polarized conflicts or to arrive in time for
prevention or first official reactions or to stay for implementation, if CRS
does intervene. These communities also cannot assure that their local
officials will cooperate with CRS in a crisis. As a result, state and local
governments will at times want to institutionalize their own collaborative
dispute resolution approach to polarized conflict. Those designing the state or
local intervenor office may flounder, though, in part because of how
intervenors must operate in order to achieve success in the midst of polarized
community conflicts, the topic of the next section.
II. THE CHALLENGES OF INTERVENING IN POLARIZED
COMMUNITY CONFLICTS
The challenges posed by institutionalizing intervenors for polarized
community conflicts stem, in part, from the challenges of intervening in this
context. The polarized conflict intervenor's task differs markedly from that
of the court mediator for a typical court case and therefore so must the ways
in which these offices of intervenors are designed.
A court mediation often unfolds as follows: pursuant to an order or
agreement, the parties to litigation sit at a conference table and the mediator
takes them through stages of introductions, presentation of what occurred and
their interests, expression of feelings about the matter, exploration of
alternative resolutions, and, sometimes, settlement-usually in a matter of
hours. In other words, court mediators for a typical case follow a similar
structure in each case and often facilitate a scheduled event; therefore,
designing an office for them is comparatively less complicated.62
61 Id.
62 DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR
NEUTRALS AND ADvOCATES 95-97 (2008) (explaining the necessity for a neutral
bargaining environment). See also JOSEPH B. STULBERG & LELA P. LOvE, THE MIDDLE
VOICE: MEDIATING CONFLICT SUCCESSFULLY (2d ed. 2013) (also offers some techniques
for polarized conflicts); KIMBERLY KOVACH, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
26-49 (3d ed. 2004); SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE § 3.2
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Intervenors in polarized community conflicts differ from court mediators
in ways that increase the complexity of creating an effective public office for
them. This section details what these intervenors do on a regular basis that
sets them apart from typical court mediators.
A. Proactive entry
Thomas became involved in part on his own initiative. He was a Sanford
official, but he assumed a new role. Other intervenors also note the
importance of proactive entry." City officials may view the conflict as a
unique one-so the cumulative experience of other communities seems
irrelevant.' The communities may also under-estimate the costs of potential
conflict, and community leaders therefore might not call for intervenors. In
fact, community leaders may avoid planning for unrest, even in the extreme
circumstances that similar communities have encountered violence over
similar conflicts. After studying communities around the world, Mary B.
Anderson and Marshall Wallace concluded:
Many who live in conflict-prone areas or in areas where
wars have occurred say that they could not have imagined it
would happen to them. Some even claim that it is better not
to acknowledge [conflict]. By acknowledging it, they say,
one could make conflict more likely... But . .. it appears to
leave them unprepared. . .
In the U.S. context, former CRS intervenor Martin Walsh recalled that
local leaders sometimes had a similar reaction to those just reported in
(2013-2014); Compendium of Federal District Courts' Local ADR Rules, THE UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (June 17, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/olp/adr/compendium.html (listing rules institutionalizing dispute
resolution in federal courts, which share similar approaches).
63 CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 17, at 11; see also James H. Laue, et al.,
Getting to the Table in Policy Conflicts, 20 CONFLICT RESOLUTION Q. [PREVIOUSLY
MEDIATION Q.] 6 (1988); Richard A. Salem, Community Mediation Through Outside
Intervention, 8 PEACE & CHANGE 91 (1982); John S. Murray, Third-Party Intervention:
Successful Entry for the Uninvited, 48 ALBANY L. REV. 572 (1984); NANCY H. ROGERS
ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING DISPUTES 49-61 (2013).
64 COLEMAN, supra note 10, at 2.6 5 MARY B. ANDERSON & MARSHALL WALLACE, OPTING OUT OF WAR: STRATEGIES
TO PREVENT VIOLENT CONFLICT 19 (2013) (regarding communities internationally and
civil violence).
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communities internationally and, as a result, these local leaders impeded
CRS' intervention. Walsh explained:
It is critical at those first meetings with the police chief or
the mayor. They often say, "It was an isolated incident," or
"It's something that we are in control of," and there is either
a deliberate or a non-deliberate attempt to block and head off
any further deliberations from outside. They often say,
"We're handling it, we can handle it, it's really nothing
major." In my mind, that's the usual mindset of authorities.66
The antagonists in the conflict and interest groups that need to be part of
any larger solution may also resist involvement, necessitating proactive work
by the intervenors to engage them as well.
Proactive entry, in sum, often involves persuading local officials and
many others that a particular conflict may unfold in ways that could polarize
the community while failing to secure the gains they seek for that
community, that may exceed their experience and training, and for which
intervenors could offer the benefit of experience and skills gained elsewhere.
B. Early intervention
Thomas suggested contacting CRS immediately, probably moving up the
time that CRS would have intervened proactively on its own accord.
Moreover, local officials trusted Thomas, a circumstance that averted
resistance to intervention by CRS, the issue just discussed that slows CRS
work in some other settings.67
Early intervention may have positively shaped the events that followed
relatively quickly in Sanford. Thomas and CRS intervened early in Sanford,
and no riots, arrests, nor violence occurred during the polarized conflict
there. Perhaps riots, multiple arrests, and even violence would not have
otherwise occurred in Sanford as they did in Cincinnati in 200168 and Los
66 Interview by the Conflict Information Consortium with Martin Walsh, former
CRS Intervenor (June 13, 2001), http://www.civilrightsmediation.org/interviews/
Martin Walsh.shtml.
67 See Interview by the Conflict Information Consortium with Dick Salem, former
CRS regional director (Mar. 14, 2000), http://www.civilrightsmediation.org/
interviews/DickSalem.shtml (discussing resistance to the interventions by CRS
conciliators).
61 See infra text accompanying notes 196-99.
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Angeles in 1991-92, 6 in somewhat analogous situations. Though unique
characteristics preclude attributing a causal relationship between each early
intervention and the results, those studying polarized conflict more broadly
identify early intervention as a constructive strategy. Experienced public
policy mediators Susan L. Carpenter and W.J.D. Kennedy trace the usual
trajectory:
Many conflicts start with a resolvable problem and grow
beyond hope of resolution because they are not dealt with
early . . . One or more parties choose not to acknowledge
that a problem exists. Other groups are forced to escalate
their activities to gain recognition for their concerns.
Eventually everyone engages in an adversarial battle,
throwing more time and money into "winning" than into
solving the problem."o
C. Getting to the heart of the problem
Like Thomas, other intervenors at times urge communities to define
problems more broadly than public officials might be initially inclined to do,
though tempered by what is feasible to achieve.n Broadening the issues helps
those involved to deal with the heart of the problem, as discussed above,
not just the incident that raises public emotions. Jay Rothman, an intervenor
in the aftermath of the 2001 police shooting and riots in Cincinnati,
emphasized this point in the context of civil rights conflict:
Identity-based conflicts are often rooted in a history of social
exclusion of social groups, usually racial and ethnic
minorities, that generate a bitter legacy of resentment,
69 See infra text accompanying note 142.
70 CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 17, at 11, 16; see also PETER T. COLEMAN,
THE FIVE PERCENT: FINDING SOLUTIONS TO SEEMINGLY IMPOSSIBLE CONFLICTs 3 (2011);
COLEMAN, supra note 10, at 11 (those studying mediation legal disputes also counsel for
early mediation, but more often to reduce litigation costs and preserve continuing
relationships); John Lande, The Movement Toward Early Case Handling in Courts and
Private Dispute Resolution, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 81-89 (2008); Roselle L.
Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know from
Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 641, 677-78 (2002).
7 PETER T. COLEMAN, supra note 70, at 45, 123-141; CARPENTER & KENNEDY,
supra note 17, at 58-59.
72 See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
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conflict and often violence. While a new future must be
forged ... it can't be done by trying to "wall off' that past
and calling for a new future based on some kind of collective
amnesia of historical wrongs and grievances."
D. Creating and tailoring a process for each conflict
Thomas and CRS mediators facilitated creation of Sanford Pastors
Connecting and arranged for that new group to provide information to those
who might distrust other sources. Other intervenors recall that they invented
processes to fit other volatile situations; there were, as Thomas put it, "no
cookie cutter" processes because each volatile situation differed from
others.74
E. Deciding whom to engage in the process
Intervenors in polarized conflicts interact more than plaintiffs and
defendants in cases. CRS mediators and Thomas, for example, are involved
in discussions with a number of interest groups and individuals throughout
the community and representatives of national groups that became active in
Sanford. In fact, they dealt with group leaders even when those groups were
urging racist or anti-government actions.75 Sometimes public officials and
others take issue with this approach.7 ' But intervenors may respond that they
must talk to those with information or influence.77 Further, two experienced
intervenors point out, "Just one party, inadvertently overlooked, may later
7 Jay Rothman, Applying Action Evaluation on a Large Scale: Cincinnati Police-
Community Relations Collaborative - Successes, Failures and Lessons Learned, in FROM
IDENTITY-BASED CONFLICT TO IDENTITY-BASED COOPERATION: THE ARIA APPROACH IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 191, 204 (Jay Rothman ed., 2012); see also Jay Rothman,
Identity and Conflict: Collaboratively Addressing Police-Community Conflict in
Cincinnati, Ohio, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 105, 127-28 (2006).
74 Francis E. McGovern, Mediation of the Snake River Basin Adjudication, 42 IDAHO
L. REV. 547, 549-51 (2006); PODZIBA,supra note 12, at 133-35 (chart on how to design
for the situation); CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 17, at 92; GREIG & DIEHL, supra
note 13, at 6-18.
" LEVINE, supra note 13, at 27 ("[Local authorities] resented federal officials
dignifying the 'disreputable' by seeking their information and treating it with equal
respect. But only in this way could the conciliator get a feeling for the phenomenon of
multiple truths.").
76 See infra text accompanying notes 180-83.
n Oral History Project, supra note 13 (interviews with eighteen former CRS
intervenors on the topic of identifying the people to involve).
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undermine the legitimacy of the effort by publicly criticizing it as non-
inclusive."78
Throughout, intervenors manage competing and changing decisions
about whom to involve and in what ways. At times, intervenors may urge
officials to limit those who are part of the process to a manageable number.7 9
Intervenors might add participants as new issues arise.s
F. Building the community's resilience in dealing with differences
Intervenors report that building relationships among polarized sectors of
the local community-as Thomas and CRS mediators did by organizing
Sanford Pastors Connecting and then in the police task force that would
continue beyond the intervention-is crucial to helping them deal with
underlying problems over time. 8 "[T]he better the relationships among
participants, the more they can focus their attention on substantive questions .
.," according to Carpenter and Kennedy. 82
In what may be one of the strongest reasons to institutionalize
intervenors at the state and local levels, intervenors emphasize that building
or re-building relationships takes time.8" Long-term engagement permits
intervenors to establish and strengthen relationships and new identities that
span groups.8 4 They can then also foster creation of structures to fashion
solutions to the deeper causes for the conflict over the long term." For
78 LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JENNIFER THOMAS-LARMER, Conducting a Conflict
Assessment, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
REACHING AGREEMENT 99, 105 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999).
7 Carpenter, supra note 13, at 990-96.
80 CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 17, at 5.
81 ROBERT D. PUTNAM & LEWIS M. FELDSTEIN, BETTER TOGETHER: RESTORING THE
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 9 (2003) ("[S]ocial capital is necessarily a local phenomenon
because it is defined by connections among people who know one another. Even when
we talk about social capital in national and regional organization (United Parcel Service
or the Texas Industrial Area Foundations, for example), we are really talking about a
network or accumulation of mainly local connections.").
82 Carpenter, supra note 12, at 61, 85.
8 Melinda Smith, The Catron County Citizens Group: A Case Study in Community
Collaboration, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
REACHING AGREEMENT 985, 1008 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999).
84 ANDERSON & WALLACE, supra note 65, at 25-31 (importance of developing a
collective identity that was "comfortable, familiar, and natural" that surmounted in
importance the reasons for the disagreement).
85 PUTNAM & FELDSTEIN, supra note 81, at 9 ("One lesson is that creating robust
social capital takes time and effort. For the most part, it develops through extensive and
time-consuming face-to-face conversation between two individuals or among small
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example, political scientists Robert D. Putnam and Lewis M. Feldstein tell of
a Texas region where cleavages among Hispanic Catholics, black Protestants,
suburban Jews, and others not only sowed unrest, but also prevented
progress. Over time, the residents organized "Valley Interfaith" to work
together for a sales tax, with thirty percent of the revenues dedicated to a
joint community-building agenda, and collaborated to change political
representation so that the various groups that were previously not well-
represented could hold more sway in city politics."6 As with other community
relationship-building ventures, the intervention took years.
In addition to improving relationships among antagonists, the intervenors
helped Sanford re-build what some scholars call "social capital," the regular
interactions and relationships that give communities resilience to new shocks
and the ability to solve problems." Like the commentators on building
relationships in general, Putnam and Feldstein emphasize the time and effort
required to build social capital:
One lesson is that creating robust social capital takes time
and effort ... For the most part, the people and groups ...
groups of people... It takes person-to-person contact over time to build the trust and
mutual understanding that characterize the relationships that are the basis of social
capital. So we see no way that social capital can be created instantaneously or en
masse."). For a discussion of importance of relationship-building, see William R.
Potapchuk & Jarle Crocker, Implementing Consensus-Based Agreements, in THE
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT
527, 544-45 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999); PODZIBA, supra note 12, at 143-56.
86 PUTNAM & FELDSTEIN, supra note 81, at 17, 32.
8 PUTNAM & FELDSTEIN, supra note 81, at 2-3 ("As used by [these] social scientists,
social capital refers to social networks, norms of reciprocity, mutual assistance, and
trustworthiness. The central insight of this approach is that social networks have real
value both for the people in those networks-hence, networking as a career strategy, for
example-as well as for bystanders.... Among the many different forms of social capital
one distinction ... Some networks link people who are similar in crucial respects and tend
to be inward-looking-bonding social capital. Others encompass different types of
people and tend to be outward-looking-bridging social capital... So a pluralist
democracy requires lots of bridging social capital.. .The problem is that bridging social
capital is harder to create than bonding social capital ... "); see also Robert Wuthnow, The
United States: Bridging the Privileged and the Marginalized?, in DEMOCRACIES IN FLUX:
THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 59, 102 (Robert D.
Putnam ed. 2002) ("At present, significant attention in the United States needs to be
devoted to creating social capital that does a better job of bridging between the privileged
and the marginalized."); COLEMAN, supra note 10, at 21 ("[C]ommunities whose
members are highly involved will have more controversies, and feelings will be more
intense about the issues, but these controversies are likely to be carried on within
ordinary democratic processes without degenerating into a 'fight to the finish."').
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seek better schools, neighborhood improvement, better
contracts with their employers, economic advantage, or some
other particular good, with social capital a means to those
ends and an important fringe benefit but not in itself their
main aim."
Though community polarization was noted in as early as 1787 by the
Federalists," one novel aspect of the nation's current situation relates to the
speed at which conflict might escalate, making the process of building
resilience both more urgent and more complex. Robert Putnam and Lewis
Feldstein, for example, note that a resilient community requires connections
and even trust among dissimilar people (which they call "bridging social
capital").90 Unfortunately, they add, over the last few decades technology
use, two-career couples, and urban sprawl, to name a few factors, have
diminished involvement with community organizations, thereby cutting into
people's interactions with those who hold dissimilar views and who have had
different experiences." A recent Pew survey indicates that people are more
likely now than any time during the last two decades to say that most of their
friends share their political views and that the other party is a "threat to the
nation's well-being." 92 Sociologist Robert Withnow contends that
marginalized groups in particular lack faith in their ability to achieve change
and the resources to participate in issues advocacy, leading to fewer
interactions between the privileged and marginalized residents of this nation
and therefore less social capital and trust that might bridge the divides
88 PUTNAM & FELDSTEIN,supra note 81, at 9-10.
89 James Madison raised this concern in a Federalist paper, "A friend of popular
governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when
he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice [of factions]." MADISON, supra
note 12 (Madison was responding to a paper by Alexander Hamilton on "domestic
faction."). See also, THE FEDERALIST PAPER No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton).
90PUTNAM & FELDSTEIN, supra note 81, at 2-4; see also COLEMAN, supra note 10, at
22 ("[I]f ... affiliations are confined mostly within ethnic groups, or economic strata, or
religious groups, and fail to tie these groups to one another, the lines of cleavage are
already set.").
1 See supra note 90.
92 Political Polarization in the American Public: How Increasing Ideological
Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy Affect Politics, Compromise and Everyday Life, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER (June 12, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-
polarization-in-the-american-public/ (By 2014 "[n]early two-thirds (63%) of consistent
conservatives and about half (49%) of consistent liberals say most of their close friends
share their political views. . . In each party, the share with a highly negative view of the
opposing party has more than doubled since 1994.").
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between them. 9 Still, others study the negative effects on community
resilience of news coverage that reinforces the audiences' views and tends to
demonize those who disagree. 94 Together, these scholars' research represents
a warning that people's trust of each other may be eroding. As a result, these
groups may shorten discussion of their differences and more precipitously
resort to tactics leading to bitterness or even violence. Cumulatively, the
work by these social scientists underscores the importance of the intervenor's
role in establishing groups that will continue after the intervention and in
other ways fostering positive relationships within the community.
G. Bringing in new information and developing ways to disseminate it
CRS mediators brought to the Sanford conflict both their expertise in
police-community relations and that of Department of Justice colleagues.
The need for intervenors to introduce expertise arises in other ways as well.
Carol Liebman recounted a situation in which she co-facilitated discussions
on a racially-charged conflict between Columbia University officials and
students, some of whom were on a hunger strike and others occupying a
campus building.96 When the students began negotiations by reading a list of
demands in an angry tone, the facilitators decided to teach the students how
to negotiate effectively within a consensus-based process, something
Liebman believed contributed to the parties reaching agreement. 9 in a
fishing rights conflict involving Native American tribes, commercial fishers,
and others in complex trade-offs about the types of fishing, times of fishing,
geographic areas, approaches to catching the fish, and more, intervenors
called in computer experts to identify options that best fit the parties'
" Wuthnow, supra note 87, at 101-02.
94 MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 147-52, 181-82 (2013).
9s Profiles in ADR, supra note 30, at 42; McMorris-Santoro, supra note 6 ("[The
Sanford Mayor] said federal officials arrived with experience on how to handle large
crowds and engage with protest movements. They had tips on police tactics, too ....
'These guys [Justice Department advisers] have been there, done it, they're very astute,'
Triplett said. 'We on the city side, we fix roads. We make sure your lights turn off and
on. We make sure your toilets flush. We cut ribbons for new businesses. So you've got to
rely on those that know.').
96 Carol B. Liebman, Mediation as Parallel Seminars: Lessons from the Student
Takeover of Columbia University's Hamilton Hall, in STORIES MEDIATORS TELL 245,
245-48 (Eric R. Galton & Lela P. Love eds., 2012) (the mediation occurred in 1996).
97 Id. at 254, 271-72. See also COLEMAN, supra note 10, at 13, 24-25 (importance of
teaching about role of the media); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (2014)
http://www.justice.gov/crs/what-we-do/training (describes CRS training programs).
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interests.9 8 In addition, intervenors retain experts on technology to educate
the public, conduct surveys, and analyze information.99 In these and other
ways, intervenors teach and orchestrate experts in addition to their facilitative
roles.
H. Responding to new issues over a substantial period
With Thomas' guidance, Sanford remained engaged long enough to
implement a structure for broad resident involvement with the police
department and other municipal services. Implementation represents only one
reason for sustained involvement, however; experienced intervenors note that
a political change can also derail a consensus plan unless the intervenor stays
involved."oo "Parachuting in" and leaving quickly may result in few lasting
changes relating to the causes of the conflict and, as a result, the conflicts re-
emerge. o
I. Working ahead ofpolarized conflict
Even experts dismay at predicting whether "any given conflict will
degenerate to intractability."'02 Recognizing this issue, CRS does research to
identify communities at risk of strife and, as resources permit, interacts with
them in advance to deal with concerns (in addition to building relationships
as discussed immediately above).'
98 Frances McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex
Litigation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 460-66 (1986). See also Carpenter, 1999, supra note
13, at 61, 84-85 (process and options); CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 17, at 9-10,
124-127 (options).
9 Connie P. Ozawa, Making the Best Use of Technology, in THE CONSENSUS
BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT 401, 407-
08, 418-25 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999).
'00 Potapchuk & Crocker, supra note 85, at 551-52; CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra
note 17, at 151-54.
"o' Rothman (2012), supra note 73, at 191, 199-200; David Matz, Parachuting In,
19(2) DisP. RESOL. MAG. 20, 21 (2013).
102 COLEMAN, supra note 70, at 5.
103 LEVINE, supra note 13, at 105 n. 5 (The U.S. reflects its confidence that readiness
is important as it funds intervenors in other nations that have experienced recent internal
violence.); Craig Zelizer, The Business of Peacebuilding, in INTEGRATED
PEACEBUILDING: INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO TRANSFORMING CONFLICT 31, 37-39
(Craig Zelizer ed., 2013) (reporting that a portion of USAID funding is to work on
conflict-about $26 million in operating and grants for conflict and peacebuilding
reported in 2010 plus $55 million for "transitions initiatives" plus contributions through
the United Nations for non-military peacebuilding initiatives).
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Sanford is not the only community in which a local intervenor worked in
advance of the incident that provoked demonstrations. Elsewhere, a local
community mediation organization has played the intervenor role for a time,
or a respected private resident has done so.'" Still, in many instances the
CRS does not arrive and no experienced intervenor steps forward who can
gain the ear of the interest groups or government officials early, before the
disputing groups become polarized.'0 As two scholars note about this issue
on an international basis, "First ... many conflicts remain unmediated as
present arrangements rely on volunteers to recognize that a problem exists
and then take appropriate action to intervene .... Second, [without
establishing the intervenors in advance, one can]not necessarily ensure that
the right mediators with proper training are matched with the conflict at
hand.""o'
J. Putting it together
A picture of effective intervenors in a polarized conflict emerges from
the Sanford example and the collective views of experienced intervenors and
scholars. In this picture, intervenors are watching and ready, looking for
moments in which they might engage antagonistic parties and others who
might help them to collaborate on ways to avoid violence and solve
underlying problems. They build their skills through extensive experience
and analysis. They know and draw on experts. The effective intervenors act
proactively, creatively, quickly, honestly, flexibly, personably, and with
broader public values in mind when they enter complex and volatile
situations.
To put it another way, intervenors cannot be risk-averse or tied to their
desks. They cannot wait weeks for permission. They cannot use the same
template each time. They cannot merely be sent to a training and then
deemed ready. They cannot be required to handle 20 cases a week. They
need to be available but, as with Andrew Thomas in Sanford, Florida, they
may not be needed full-time to intervene. In short, institutionalizing access to
intervenors is a tall order.
The next section turns to that challenge-to create an institutionalized
state and local version of what Thomas provided.
'" PODZIBA, supra, note 12, at 75-76.
" Joseph B. Stulberg, Tony, in STORIES MEDIATORS TELL 309, 320 (Eric R. Galton
& Lela P. Love eds., 2012) (The case discussed "reaffirms the significance of having an
independent, proactive community-based dispute resolution resource available to its
citizens.").
106 GREIG & DIEHL, supra note 13, at 174.
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III. THREE QUESTIONS TO GUIDE THE CREATION (OR RE-CREATION) OF
PUBLIC OFFICES OF INTERVENORS AT THE STATE AND LOCAL LEVEL
State and local governments have created offices for intervenors for
polarized community conflicts in a number of public agencies (a term used
here for simplicity).'o Intervenors have been placed within the governor's
office, 1os civil rights/equal opportunity agencies, '09 executive branch
agencies,110 a free-standing state agency with a governing board appointed by
officials from all three branches of government,"' community mediation
centers, 112 courts, " and universities. 114 The choice may follow careful
107 CHRIS CARLSON, SOLUTIONS TO ESTABLISHING SouND GOVERNMENT DR
PRACTICES, EXECUTIVE ORDERS: How GOVERNORS CAN PROMOTE COLLABORATIVE
PROCESSES AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR MORE EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE 8 (2000);
Policy Consensus Initiatives Working Group, Report on Barriers to the Use of ADR in
States and Approaches for Overcoming Them II, THE KITCHEN TABLE DEMOCRACY (last
visited Sep. 24, 2015), http://www.policyconsensus.org/publications/reports/
state adr barriers.html.
108 Howard S. Bellman & William R. Drake, New Negotiating Tools for Governors,
THE KITCHEN TABLE DEMOCRACY (last visited Sep. 24, 2015),
http://www.policyconsensus.org/publications/reports/negotiatinggovernors.html; Mario
M. Cuomo, Governing as an ADR Process, THE KITCHEN TABLE DEMOCRACY (last
visited Sep. 24, 2015), http://www.policyconsensus.org/publications/reports/
governing adr process.html.
109 FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS, http://fchr.state.fl.us (historically).
110 See, e.g., Jonathan W. Reitman, The Allagash: A Case Study of a Successful
Mediation, MEDIATE.COM (June, 2003), http://www.mediate.com/articles/reitmanJ.cfm;
William R. Drake, Statewide Offices of Mediation, 5 NEGOT. J. 359, 361-62 (1989)
(noting three state-level offices dealing with public disputes within the executive branch);
Lawrence Susskind, Experiments in Statewide Offices of Mediation, in STATEWIDE
OFFICES OF MEDIATION: EXPERIMENTS IN PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1987).
"' The Ohio Commission on Dispute Resolution and Conflict Management,
appointed by representatives of the three branches of Ohio government, intervened in
some public conflicts, beginning in the 1990s. OHIO REV. CODE § 179.01. However, the
Ohio General Assembly repealed the Commission's authorization in 2011. Ohio Am.
Sub. H.B. 153 (2011).
112 See story of the New Mexico mediation, infra text accompanying notes 228-35.
113 See story of the court-supervised interventions infra text accompanying notes
196-99, 201-07; Drake, supra note 110, at 361-62 (noting Hawaii Supreme Court
program).
114 Stephan Sonnenberg & James L Cavallaro, Name, Shame, and Then Build
Consensus? Bringing Conflict Resolution Skills to Human Rights, 29 WASH. U. J. OF LAW
& POL'Y 257, 301 (2012) (law school based clinics in human rights issues); William D.
Ruckelshaus, From Conflict to Collaboration: Restoring Trust in Government, KITCHEN
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study, or, instead, may occur due to the happenstance that an agency's
leader is willing to establish an intervenor role."' Political considerations-
yet another explanation for the site chosen-may explain why Congress
initially placed CRS in the Commerce Department."' A reporter wrote in
1964-when civil rights issues divided Congress-that placing CRS in an
agency headed by the former Governor of a Southern state was designed to
increase CRS's acceptability to Southern leaders." Is
Planners have established offices of intervenors at various levels of
government. Sanford's Thomas worked at the local level, for example, while
Maryland's MACRO, discussed later, is a state entity." 9 As with the choice
of public agency, the level of government may depend on political realities
and on whether intervenors will have enough to do at each level, given the
scale and types of conflict.
In addition to differences in the government agency and the levels of
government that house the office of intervenors, the office itself may vary in
size. Sanford, Florida illustrates how a small community can institutionalize
an intervention capacity by employing an intervenor who performs other
functions when not needed to intervene.
The three questions in this section respond to the frequent need to design
a new office of intervenors. Intermittent funding requires re-establishing
intervention functions in these or other offices from time to time, regardless
of the size, selected public agency, or level of government.'2 0 Sometimes the
TABLE DEMOCRACY (May 1997), http://www.policyconsensus.org/publications/reports/
conflict collaboration. html (university-based interventions in environmental issues).
1" GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND CONFLICT
MANAGEMENT, MOVING FROM CONFLICT TO COOPERATION (1990) (The legislation
creating the Ohio Commission on Dispute Resolution and Conflict Resolution in the
1990s followed a multi-year study by the Govemor's Commission on Peace and Conflict
Management. The Commission recommended statutory creation of the Ohio Dispute
Resolution and Conflict Management Commission. This was done through enactment of
OHIO REV. CODE § 179.01, repealed in Ohio Am. Sub. H.B. 153 (2011)).
'
1 6 CARLSON, supra note 107, at 8.
1" 42 U.S.C.S § 2000g (2015) (In 1966 the President and Congress moved CRS to
the Justice Department. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1966, 31 F.R. 6187, 80 Stat. 1607
(1966)).
I" Cabell Phillips, Johnson Pleads for Compliance, But Vows Rights Enforcement,
N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 1964), http://www.nytimes.com/1964/07/03/johnson-pleads-for-
compliance-but-vows-rights-enforcement.html?_r-0, quoted in LEVINE, supra note 13, at
12.
"
9 See supra text accompanying notes 26-34, 145-52.
120 Chris Carlson & Heather Anderson, Dispute Resolution in the Public Sector:
What Makes Programs Survive, Thrive, or Die?, 20 DIsP. RESOL. MAG., no. 3, Spring
2014, at 11, 12, 16; Drake, supra note 110, at 359, 364 n. 5 (noting state-level dispute
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public agency itself disappears, while at other times the public agency cuts
the resources devoted to intervening in polarized conflicts.12 ' For example,
community mediation centers can become proactive intervenors in polarized
conflicts, but face difficulty in maintaining funding to do so,1 2 2 and have
often closed or re-focused on activities such as training that created another
income stream.1 23 Those designing localized offices of intervenors should ask
and answer these three questions because of the special hurdles that
intervenors in polarized conflict encounter regardless of their size, the
agencies that manage their interventions, or the level of government where
the offices reside:
A. Question One: Will public officials make the key decisions (e.g.,
Should we intervene? When? Should we ask stakeholders to discuss the
immediate crisis only or also the underlying concerns that led to the crises?)
and do so with input from experienced intervenors who understand the
context and conflict (e.g., Would collaborative dispute resolution methods
succeed in this setting)?
Issues both of feasibility and policy underlie decisions regarding whether
the public should fund any particular intervention, how deeply the intervenor
should press regarding the causes of the conflict, and when the intervention
should occur.'24 To complicate the task, sometimes an effective intervention
resolution offices that began and ended in the executive branch and discussing new ones,
most of which now no longer exist).
. 12' CARLSON, supra note 107, at 8 (state agencies struggle to get resources for state
offices to manage consensus building); Policy Consensus Initiatives Working Group,
supra note 107; Jill Purdy, An Overview of State Dispute Resolution Programs, THE
KITCHEN TABLE DEMOCRACY (July 1998), http://www.policyconsensus.org/publications
reports/state drprograms_overview.html (of 28 state programs, 15 in courts, 7 in
universities, and 6 in executive branch; state support funded only 25% to 85% of the total
budget and some had no state funds).
122 Terry Amsler, Community Dispute Resolution: Assessing Its Importance and
Addressing Its Challenges: An Introduction to the Community Dispute Resolution Issue,
19 DisP. RESOL. MAG., no. 2, Winter 2013, at 4, 6; Wendy E. Hollingshead Corbett &
Justin R. Corbett, Community Mediation in Economic Crisis: The Reemergence of
Precarious Sustainability, 11 NEV. L.J. 458, 459 (2011).
. 123 Doug Van Epps, Public Funding of Community Dispute Resolution Centers, 19
DisP. RESOL. MAG., no. 2, Winter 2013, at 7, 10.
124Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Peacemaking in the Culture War Between Gay Rights
and Religious Liberty, 95 IOWA L. REV. 747, 755 (2010) (referencing conflict pitting
religious rights and gay rights; continuum of public and private concerns); GREIG &
DIEHL, supra note 13, at 13-14 (importance of reflecting the public priorities in terms of
when to intervene in the international context).
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must operate alongside an attempt to achieve political change - in order for
either to work.125 Conflict specialist Craig Zelizer has noted this tendency in
examining interventions conducted in other nations: "Over the past fifteen
years it has become abundantly clear that development work cannot advance
without addressing the underlying dynamics of violence, while peace-
building is not effective without addressing the basic needs of people through
economic opportunity, basic health services, and a functioning legal
system."l 26 To take these considerations into account, those making decisions
about interventions need to be (a) in touch with the public interests and the
initiatives of others in government or elsewhere and (b) in discussions with
experienced intervenors with knowledge about the pertinent conflict and
context.
Listing what commentators contend should be weighed by
decisionmakers in each polarized conflict serves to underscore the
importance of having a public official making the decision but with input
from an experienced intervenor with knowledge about what is happening on
the local level. On the potentially positive side of intervention, commentators
suggest examining whether an intervention will:
* Avert violence (e.g., those on both sides of the abortion issue agree
on efforts to reduce the likelihood of violence between their groups though
they continue to disagree vehemently on whether abortion should be
legal);1 27
* Help people understand the views of people on "the other side";'
* Set "a tone of rationality, openness and the need for decision which
made it possible for factions to negotiate differences";1 29
" See U.S. Dep't of Justice Cmty. Relations Serv., Avoiding Racial Conflict: A
Guide for Municipalities, http://www.justice.gov/archive/crs/pubs/avoidracial.htm (last
visited Sep. 24, 2015) (abstract notes importance of the right laws, human relations
commissions, fair housing, voting rights); U.S. Dep't of Justice Cmty. Relations Serv.,
Principles of Good Policing: Avoiding Violence Between Police and Citizens,
http://www.justice.gov/archive/crs/pubs/principlesofgoodpolicingfinal092003.pdf (last
revised Sept. 2003).
126 Zelizer, supra note 17, at xi-xii.
127 PODZIBA, supra note 12, at 13-14. This goal is explicitly listed in the legislation
creating CRS. 42 U.S.C.S § 2 0 00g-1 (2015).
128 LEVINE, supra note 13, at 242 (peer review of the Natchez, Mississippi
intervention); Smith, supra note 83, at 1003-04, 1007; Susan L. Podziba, Civic Fusion:
Moving from Certainty through Not Knowing to Curiosity, 30 NEGOTIATION J. 243, 243
(2014) ("[B]ringing people close together under conditions that enable them to bond,
even as their polarizing beliefs remain intact.").
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* Reach a widely-embraced solution (e.g., setting a place for those
seeking odd jobs to gather that was safe for the workers and traffic and
acceptable to neighborhood businesses); 3 '
* Broker communications that ultimately might lead to inclusive
political organizations that could address the roots of the conflict through
political or social change;"' and
* Cost the public less than the costs (broadly speaking) to the
community of continuing conflict.' 32
Against these positives, those deciding whether, how, and when to
intervene might weigh the risk that the intervention will:
* Not do enough good to be worth the public expenditures and
investment of persons in the community'3 3 and
* Reduce pressure for change (without brokering communications that
can lead to change) and thereby increase the chances that the polarized
community will ignore the need to consider change.13 4
CRS provides one workable model for combining policy and practice in
decision-making. CRS is structured to give public officials the input of
experienced intervenors when they decide whether and bow to intervene. The
Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides for Presidential nomination and Senate
confirmation of the CRS director and requires annual reports to Congress,
making the director responsive to the public policies of the nation. '
Congress also asked CRS to notify the pertinent Congressional committee
each time it deploys staff to intervene.' 6 Those who make the initial and
129 LEVINE, supra note 13, at 242 (peer review of the Natchez, Mississippi
intervention). See generally THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1999) (distilling
lessons about what occurred and was achieved from a series of case studies); PUTNAM &
FELDSTEIN, supra note 81, at 17, 32.
130 Lela P. Love, Glen Cove, in STORIES MEDIATORS TELL 331, 331-33 (Eric R.
Galton & Lela P. Love eds., 2012); LEVINE, supra note 13, at 242.
1' PUTNAM & FELDSTEIN, supra note 81, at 17; LEVINE, supra note 13, at 242.
132 ANDERSON & WALLACE, supra note 65, at 18-25; CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra
note 17, at 3-4.
133 SUSSKIND & THOMAS-LARMER, supra note 78, at 102-05.
134 See, e.g., Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy
and Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON
DIsP. REsOL. 1, 24 (1993).
13s 42 U.S.C.S §§ 2000g; 2000g-3 (2015).
136 2013 CRS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 9, at 7.
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ongoing decisions regarding CRS interventions are both experienced
intervenors in polarized conflicts, and public officials responsible to the U.S.
Attorney General on the general strategy, including consistency with the
Department's policies on civil rights policies and justice.13 For example,
Richard A. Salem, a former head of a CRS regional office, recalled the
intertwined public policy and strategy questions involved in just the decision
regarding whether to intervene:
Okay, number one was potential for violence. Assuming it's
within our jurisdiction, the mandate of the agency. Number
two, is it likely we can have some impact? How many
people are involved? Another is, who's asking us? Is it a
school superintendent, is it the head of the NAACP, is it a
congressman's office, is it the director calling from
Washington? This all had a practical impact on whether we
responded or not. That had an impact on how effective we
could be. It had an impact on how important the matter was,
and the political consequence to the agency of responding or
not responding, which obviously is a matter that you had to
take into consideration. That wasn't overriding, but it could
have some impact. How long had the problem been
persisting? Have we ever been in that matter before? What
other efforts had been undertaken? Was this intractable, or
was this something that was new and fresh? Was this
something we had experience in? Do we have a higher
expectation of success based on our experience? Did we
have the money to respond? Did we have the personnel to
respond? What were the negatives? Was there someone who
didn't want us to respond? Maybe there was a good reason
not to. That might not be pretty always, but there well may
be a reason why we should not respond.'
Policy and feasibility also affect decisions on the shape of the
intervention.'3 9 If a specific incident sparks increased polarization and unrest,
should the intervenor address just that incident? To take such a limited
approach, commentators charge, intervenors could remove pressure to
13 LEVINE, supra note 13, at 25-29 (describing the decision-making in action).
"'oral History Project, supra note 13: Dick Salem (2000).
19 James L. Laue & Gerald W. Cormick, The Ethics of Social Intervention, in THE
ETHIcs OF SOCIAL INTERVENTION 205, 228-31 (Gordon Bermant et al. eds., 1974).
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change the status quo without helping those involved to achieve change.1 4 0
To examine the root causes, by contrast, might facilitate change with long-
term benefits but it would take more time and resources.141 Former CRS
Mediator Silke Hansen explained why CRS mediators who weigh strategy
and policy should not define their intervention goals too narrowly:
[I]n racial conflicts, there are two taproots growing
simultaneously. One is a perception or belief of unfair
treatment or discrimination. The other is a lack of confidence
in any redress system. There is the belief that, "Even if I
140 Nader, supra note 134, at 24 ("The drum beat [toward informal resolution of
disputes] serves as a battering ram to reduce the rights of victims in order to sue
perpetrators of harm and to pacify the public at large."); Amy J. Cohen, Dispute Systems
Design, Neoliberalism, and the Problem of Scale, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 51, 54
(2009) ("I suggest further that to the extent projects of [dispute system design] are
unfolding against a backdrop of neoliberal ideas and practices, this structural similarity
stands to strengthen some of these ideas and practices, and with them attendant forms of
social inequality."). Commentators sometimes view the trade-offs as between settling and
litigation, but litigation often cannot resolve polarized conflicts, so the alternative to a
successful intervention becomes more efforts to assert power, such as publicity, unrest,
and even violence. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The History of an Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
1273, 1277 (2009) (referring litigation as alternative to settlement).
141 Cf. Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change,
2007 J. DIsp. RESOL. 1, 43 (2007) (In the intra-institution context, noting, "This
methodology structures inquiry about the nature of a problem and its relationship to
intervention strategies by continually prompting a series of questions about the
appropriate scope and goal of an intervention: What kind of problem is this? Why is it
considered a problem and by whom? How does it relate to other problems you have seen?
What is causing this problem? What would it take to remedy it here and for others? What
can be done about it now and in the future? The conflict resolver continually probes
whether the questions as posed locate the problem at the level where it can be
meaningfully addressed."); Cohen, supra note 140, at 76 (Cohen suggests the following
questions to get at the broader scale implications: "What are the potential distributional
effects of configuring a dispute at one level of jurisdiction or geography versus another,
for example, as a dispute within a particular bounded locality (the city) or, conversely, as
one that implicates the state and its ability to devolve or retain the power to regulate
private and public space through zoning, taxation, and eminent domain? How do these
alternative ways of configuring the jurisdictional boundaries of a dispute inform an
individual's or a collective's understandings and experiences of being a stakeholder? Do
background social norms and expectations make particular harms perceptible as conflict
and do they produce particular kinds of interests and negotiation strategies? Would
negotiated agreements look different if legal frameworks, jurisdictional configurations,
and social expectations were the sustained objects of change? If so, when/how should
designers try to weave the conditions shaping conflicts and shaping parties into the very
fabric of DSD?").
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complain, it is not going to make a difference."... If people
who feel they are facing despair had an effective redress
system, you wouldn't get that tension. If you didn't have a
perception of disparity in the first place, you wouldn't need
that redress system... I think one of the mistakes that we
often make in responding to that is that all we look at is the
triggering incident. We try to resolve the triggering incident,
and we totally miss all of the pieces of those two fuses... But
the fuses are still there, so unless they are dealt with, they are
going to regroup after a while, even when people don't even
remember the triggering incident anymore... With the
Rodney King situation [in Los Angeles in 1991-1992], if you
remember the disturbances... those events occurred not
when Rodney King was beaten [by police and recorded on
videotape], even though you would think that the beating
would have generated anger. But rather, the incidents
occurred when the redress system didn't work. When the
police officers were found "not guilty," that is when all hell
broke loose. The anger was about much more than the
Rodney King incident, it was about these two fuses that had
been growing.1 4 2
The timing of the intervention also implicates both policy and practice.
Former CRS intervenor Nancy Ferrell put it this way: "I wouldn't try to stop
a protest. The protest is what really gets the establishment's attention and
gives me an opportunity to say, 'So what happens next?"' 143 Wallace
Warfield, also once a CRS intervenor, added a nuance about timing:
[T]he question would be balancing out what the
demonstrators needed to do to present a forceful portrait of
the issue they were dealing with against the city's wishes to
end the demonstration entirely... So the city would say,
"This demonstration has got to end. If it doesn't end, we're
going to enforce a temporary restraining order," which
means calling the police in and the possibility of violence.
And so you'd have to negotiate that... That was... a matter
of some skill,... to work with both sides to allow for the
symbolic aspect of the demonstration..., without
142 Oral History Project, supra note 13: Silke Hansen (1999).
143 Oral History Project, supra note 13: Nancy Farrell (1999).
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compromising ... not only what they were doing, but the
implications for negotiations later on."'
The Sanford story represents a model similar to CRS in joining strategy
and policy at the local level. In Sanford, federal and local officials decided to
become involved in improving communications and to open the discussions
to broader questions of racial justice, informed by experienced intervenors
regarding Sanford's fraught civil rights history and what they could
accomplish, given limited resources. The City Manager and Andrew Thomas
also discussed issues in an ongoing way, and the arrangement worked,
perhaps because of their personal relationships.
How might a local or state agency achieve this joint policy/strategy
decision-making if the need does not justify funding an ongoing staff of
intervenors? One answer is the Sanford one-an intervenor with other
flexible job responsibilities. Another is to use contract intervenors. As
Question One emphasizes, it will be important that the public officials and
any contract intervenors stay in regular contact. For situations like this, the
next story, told through the eyes of two court administrators,145 illustrates
how a state supreme court can interact before contracting and then structure
the contract to keep public officials involved to shape the intervention,
informed by experts on the ground.
The irritations between the 9,000 residents of Frostburg Maryland and
the students at Frostburg State University had taken on racial overtones by
2011. The student body had become more racially diverse over the previous
decade, and African-American students reported that town residents, who
were predominately white, made them feel like outsiders. When two African-
American students were murdered, one in 2010 and another in 2011, in each
case by another African-American student, some town residents raised
concerns that the University was "importing" urban violence. Students
responded with outcries about racism on the part of the town, and the news
media throughout the state covered their concerns.
An arm of the state's highest court, the Maryland Court of Appeals,
awarded a grant to initiate intervention in this conflict. In 2000, the court
had created an office of dispute resolution experts, and Chief Judge Robert
M Bell, along with members of an ADR commission he had established,
charged the new office (called the Mediation and Conflict Resolution Office
'"Oral History Project, supra note 13: Wallace Warfield (2000).
145 Phone interview with Rachel Wohl and Lou Gieszl, Director and Deputy Director
of the Maryland, on December 17, 2013, and January 14, 2014, and emails from Wohl to
the author on March 18. 2014. and from Gieszl to the author on March 24. 2014.
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or "MACRO") not only to encourage the use of Mediation for cases within
the jurisdiction of Maryland courts but also to "promote more peaceful and
civil communities" and "substantially improve the way that we, as a society,
manage conflict. "146 Thus, encouraging appropriate people to apply for
grants that would pay for intervenors in a communitywide conflict fell within
the goals set by the court for MACRO. Chief Judge Bell delegated to
MACRO's director and deputy director, Rachel Wohl and Lou Gieszl, and
their Grant Review Committee, the authority to make appropriate decisions
about when and to whom to award grants to bring in intervenors, without his
involvement in the details. Wohl and Gieszl prioritized the Frostburg conflict
for intervention because of its importance to a sense of racial injustice by
residents throughout the state. They also saw the possibility of lessons
learned that could help in other "town-gown" disputes.
They recognized, though, the importance of securing local expertise
about the feasibility of achieving their goals through a collaborative dispute
resolution-based intervention. As one means offacilitating situations like this
one, MACRO has a 'fellows program " that gives classes to selected public
officials on just these topics, and a Frostburg State University vice president
happened to be one of their fellows who had taken these classes. The vice
president worked with a professor who could make an assessment of the
feasibility, how the issues should be framed, and who should be involved as
participants.
MACRO Deputy Director Gieszl advised that the grant proposal should
contemplate use of an intervenor from outside the university with previous
experience in helping in such conflicts.14 7 MA CRO funded the grant proposal
ultimately submitted by the professor-to provide facilitated dialogue
between stakeholders in the town and university for two years, allowing
independence for that initiative to operate, and asking that the university
bear some of the expenses for the project. That dialogue is now ongoing, with
intermittent discussions between University and Court officials on its shape.
In the Maryland MACRO contracting process, the public officials
making the decisions about the intervention had expertise in intervening and
146 JOIN THE RESOLUTION: THE MARYLAND ADR COMMISSION'S PRACTICAL ACTION
PLAN 2 (1999); Deborah Thompson Eisenberg et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Public Confidence in the Judiciary: ChiefJudge Bell's "Culture of Conflict Resolution",
72 MD. L. REv. 1112, 1122 (2013).
147 Gieszl noted some individuals who would meet these criteria. Phone interview
with Rachel Wohl and Lou Gieszl, Director and Deputy Director of the Maryland, on
December 17, 2013, and January 14, 2014, and emails from Wohl to the author on March
18, 2014, and from Gieszl to the author on March 24, 2014.
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could weigh competing public policy concerns. They also had input from
those knowledgeable about what would be feasible in Frostburg. The public
officials could locate experienced and talented intervenors-something that
makes the contracting out process viable. Their approach mirrors a strategy
suggested by a blue ribbon commission of public officials and private
mediators-that public officials should first ask for an "assessment" by
experienced intervenors as to whether intervention in a public conflict makes
sense and then fund an intervenor who had some level of independence from
appointing public officials, but reporting in to secure agreement on any
needed modifications.1 4 8
Both this recommended approach and the approach used for Frostburg
University unfold slowly, precluding the early proactive intervention
discussed in connection with Sanford.14 9 To deal with the time-consuming
processes of awarding grants, MACRO has a mediator on retainer who can
enter a volatile situation quickly, giving MACRO time to use the assessment
and contract approach for the long term.' The contracting out process also
does not easily lead to the preventive work in advance of a triggering
incident, "' though MACRO's fellow program might help to stimulate
preventive work by local officials.
Returning to Question One, CRS, Sanford, and the Maryland story
illustrate two responses-a staff model and a contract model. Both options
combine policy and strategy considerations. Additional responses may be
appropriate in other contexts. Though responses will vary, Question One
should be asked and answered whenever state and local governments
institutionalize interventions into polarized conflicts. The risks of not doing
so include not only wasting public resources, but also removing the force
behind legitimate winds of change.
B. Question Two: Will the public agency maintain a productive institutional
climate and culture for the interventions while being accountable for the
public funds?
148 Soc'Y FOR PROF'LS IN DisP. RESOL., BEST PRACTICES FOR GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES: GUIDELINES FOR USING COLLABORATIVE AGREEMENT-SEEKING PROCESSES
(1997) (Recommendations 4, 5, and 8) (This organization is now called the Association
for Conflict Resolution). See also SUSSKIND & THOMAS-LARMER, supra note 78, at 105
(discussing importance of assessment for other reasons as well).
149 See infra text accompanying notes 26-34; 63-66.
50 Phone interview with Rachel Wohl and Lou Gieszl, Director and Deputy Director
of the Maryland, on December 17, 2013, and January 14, 2014, and emails to the author
dated March 18, 2014, and March 24, 2014.
51 See infra text accompanying notes 102-06.
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Another challenge for those designing offices of intervenors is to create a
climate and culture' 52 (colloquially the way "things are done" within that
office)153 to foster the use of effective approaches such as those already
discussed in Part II, while remaining accountable in ways valued by the
office's funders.
1. Climate and Culture
Intervenors need a supportive institutional climate and culture to act, as
discussed above,15 4 proactively, creatively, quickly, honestly, flexibly, and
personably. That climate and culture should also support their efforts to
improve their skills and understanding of the broader public interests that
were the focus of Question One.
Climate and culture issues have plagued even those institutionalizing
mediation for cases in litigation, though, suggesting that this will be a high
hurdle for administrators to clear. Former U.S. Court of Appeals mediator
Robert Rack noted the difficulties of encouraging quality mediation for court
cases within "a highly structured, traditional, rule-bound institution.""' Rack
juxtaposed the court's climate with his desired climate for mediation this
way:
Court: "We are the court, the authority; we make the rules, issue orders,
dispense justice and make decisions; litigants come to us because they must,
and we impose the structure and procedures to which they are required to
adhere."
Mediators: "We [keep] our focus on the litigants as customers, trying to
identify their needs and wants and trying to meet them. Litigants come to the
court to get the best possible outcomes to intractable problems, and we help
them achieve their goals."'5 6
152 FRANK J. LANDY & JEFFREY M. CONTE, WORK IN THE 21 ST CENTURY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 564 (2004) ("Culture
is often associated with the more cognitive variables such as beliefs and values, and
climate is more commonly associated with more affective states such as feeling.").
153 BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., TRIAL COURTS AS ORGANIZATIONS 5 (2007).
1 See supra section II.
155 Robert Rack, A Letter to My Successor, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 429, 431
(2011).56 Id. at 430.
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In addition to the court's influence, lawyers may also influence climate
and culture for court mediators. In some contexts, commentators contend that
lawyers narrow the focus of court mediation to disputed legal issues, dashing
hopes on the part of some mediation organizers that mediators would guide
parties to discuss any disputed issues, including non-legal ones.' Regarding
court and lawyer influence, researcher Julie Macfarlane observed that "there
is evidence of ... 'convergence,' where two different structural and cultural
systems have moved closer together to produce a new form that borrows
characteristics of each."' This means that mediators may not accomplish the
issue-broadening or reconciling goals that some had sought.' Although the
analogy is not perfect, these reports on court-connected mediation represent
cautionary tales for those trying to encourage an appropriate climate and
culture for intervening in polarized conflicts.
To nourish appropriate climates and cultures for intervenors in polarized
conflicts, one might examine the levers that administrators more broadly can
adjust to create their desired climate and culture. Those studying
organizations identify the following key levers that can affect the way things
are done:
* what is valued, the norms and expectations,
* the leadership style,
* the communication patterns,
* the procedures and routines,
'" Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The "New"Arbitration?, 17 HARv. NEGOT.
L. REV. 61, 74-75 (2012); John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices
Transform Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 879-80 (1997); John M. Lande,
Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-
Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 121-23 (2002); Leonard L.
Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is? "The Problem" in Court-Connected
Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REv. 863, 874-77 (2008); Tamara Relis, Consequences of
Power, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 445, 446 (2007); Nancy Welsh, The Thinning Vision of
Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of
Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 25 (2001). But see Julie Macfarlane,
Culture Change? A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-Connected Mediation, 2002
J. DisP. RESOL. 241, 277-79 (2002) (lawyers' effect on the process varies). For different
results in domestic relations mediation, see Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the
Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce
Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1319, 1392-94 (1995). See generally, 1 COLE ET AL., supra
note 63, § 14:11.
' Julie Macfarlane, ADR and the Courts: Renewing Our Commitment to
Innovation, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 927, 931 (2012).
'
9 Nolan-Haley, supra note 157, at 74-5; Carlson & Anderson, supra note 120, at
14-16.
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* the definition of success, 160
* the personality traits of those hired,161
* what people know about the organization's history,1 62 and
* the organizational structure.1 63
For example, to encourage intervenors to prioritize their time in ways
that fit the office's goals, the leader could encourage ongoing discussions
about what that office values, reinforcing these points through awards for
particular achievements and recounting stories of intervenors acting
consistently with the office values. These values could also become the
supervisor's announced expectations that would guide compensation and
promotion decisions. The office could encourage attendance at professional
meetings with CRS or other intervenors who share the office values. The
office of intervenors could elicit feedback from those involved in the
interventions on pivotal points, such as whether the interventions were
helpful in reducing polarization or dealing with the underlying causes of
conflict, though being careful to maintain the confidentiality intervenors had
promised.'" To encourage the independent thinking needed to act quickly
and flexibly, the administrators could adjust the procedures and routines so
that intervenors could act of their own accord initially while staying in touch
with supervisors to shape ongoing decisions.
When the office of intervenors is a sub-unit of a larger agency,
administrators may have already used these levers to encourage the best
climate and culture for the larger organization, but failed to modify them as
needed to optimize the work of the sub-unit that intervenes in polarized
conflicts. 165 Intervenors will probably not enter polarized conflicts
expeditiously and flexibly if the larger public agency that houses them-
think of a court or administration agency-rewards the intervenors for the
160 OSTROM ET AL., supra note 153, at 5.
161 LANDY & CONTE, supra note 152, at 422; RONALD E. RIGGIO, INTRODUCTION TO
INDUSTRIAL/ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 437-38 (5th ed. 2008).
1 6 2 Id
63 Id.
'6 See e.g., LEVINE, supra note 13, at 40 (reporting that, for a time, CRS sent staff
members to question local residents about their impressions of CRS's intervention); see
also 2013 CRS ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 61 (CRS contacts local officials to ascertain
satisfaction and the status of the conflict).
161 See Cathy A. Costantino, Second Generation Organizational Conflict
Management Systems Design: A Practitioner's Perspective on Emerging Issues, 14
HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 81, 82, 86-88 (2009) ("How do conflict management systems fit
with other processes and initiatives within an organization?" "[1]s it reasonable to expect
that these procedures will stand the tests of time, cost, leadership, crisis, and fatigue?").
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number of cases handled, sets rule-based procedures for decisions about
when and how to intervene, hires those more likely to react than act
proactively, and selects leaders who decide slowly and take few risks.' 6 The
Maryland example just discussed illustrates how the state's highest court set
up separate expectations and procedures for MACRO, its office that would
hire intervenors for polarized community conflicts, to avoid this potential
disconnect in climate and culture between what would best serve an appellate
court and what would best serve an office of intervenors.' 67
Even one lever set incorrectly can undermine the creation of an optimal
environment for intervenors. Autocratic leaders, for example, might generate
less independent thinking and risk-taking than consultative leaders, according
to organizational experts, making some leadership structures less than ideal
for intervenors. 161 Unintended consequences like this-as well as the
tendency of court mediation units to drift toward the climate and culture of
the court overseeing them-suggest the importance of reexamining climate
and culture at intervals."s9 In short, creating and maintaining a constructive
climate or culture for intervenors always represents a challenge, and even
more so when the overall institutional climate and culture does not fit the
intervention function.
2. Accountability
Public funders hold public agencies accountable, and what the funders
measure to assess success may influence that agency's climate and culture. In
fact, intervenors may assume that agency's accountability measures define
how supervisors will judge their work-absent contrary evidence. 170 For
example, if the public agency reports to funders on the number of cases
handled and the number resolved, intervenors may narrow the issues they
'66 Rothman (2012), supra note 73, at 191, 199, 203; Rothman (2006-2007), supra
note 73, at 105, 128. See Nancy A. Welsh, The Current Transitional State of Court-
Connected ADR, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 873, 878-79, 883 (2012); Yishai Boyarin, Court-
Connected ADR-A Time of Crisis, A Time of Change, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 993, 993-94,
998-99, 1006 (2012); Macfarlane, supra note 158, at 931. The involvement of attorneys,
and their tendencies toward an adversarial approach may also affect the culture. See
generally RiGGlO, supra note 161, at 437-38 (Regarding analogous effects for court-
connected mediation).
167 See supra text accompanying notes 145-52.
168 LANDY & CONTE, supra note 152, at 564. See also Tahir Saeed et al., Leadership
Styles: Relationship with Conflict Management Styles, 25 INT'L J. CONFLICT MGMT 214,
222-23 (2014).
169 Carlson & Anderson, supra note 120, at 14-16.
"0 OSTROM ET AL., supra note 153, at 5.
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address to those that can be resolved quickly based on assumptions that they
will be rewarded for pleasing the agency's funders. Though accountability to
funders creates a tension with the desire to create the optimal culture, those
supervising the intervenors will lose funding (and their own jobs) unless they
can be accountable.
Defining success in mediation has been problematic in any event.17 ' But
the task becomes more difficult for polarized conflict intervention because
the most obvious criterion-percentage of cases settled-does not fit for
polarized conflicts. Also, the often-broad confidentiality strictures preclude
describing in detail the intervenors' work.172 Even CRS has struggled to be
accountable to Congress.' In his insightful history of CRS's first 25 years,
former CRS staff member, Bertram Levine, pointed out that CRS had no
constituency supporting it and had trouble showing success.1 4 "How can one
show that violence would have occurred, for example, absent intervention?"
Levine asked rhetorically.' Levine explained that CRS, though, developed
an overall strategy that was consistent with that of the U.S. Department of
Justice and, for a time, sent follow-up interviewers to determine whether
strategic goals were achieved in a given intervention.' 76
CRS also finessed the accountability questions because Attorneys
General tended to lend influential support for CRS budgets with Congress."
Sometimes, Levine reported, an Attorney General had to make a personal
plea to the President to save CRS from the federal budget officials seeking to
zero out its funding." In the Attorney General, CRS had a powerful ally
who understood and would vouch for what was being accomplished when
those accomplishments could not easily be measured and stories could not be
recounted in detail.
Still, CRS administrators wanted more funding on occasion and sought
to justify their requests. As former CRS regional administrator Richard
Salem recalled:
17 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Regulation ofDispute Resolution in the United States of
America: From the Formal to the Informal to the "Semi-formal, " in REGULATING
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: ADR AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 419, 447-448
(Felix Steffek et al. eds., 2013).
172 See infra text accompanying notes 220-22, 241-43.
" See infra text accompanying notes 180-83.
174 LEVINE, supra note 13, at 230-32. See also 2013 CRS ANN. REP., supra note 9, at
61 ("The level of satisfaction among the recipients of CRS services is a critical indication
of whether CRS has been successful.").
" LEVINE, supra note 13, at 230-3 1.
6 Id. at 40.
" Id. at 234-35.
7 8 Id. at 234.
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Well, you are always trying to project your successes in a
bureaucracy. Information is always needed for budget
purposes, annual reports, monthly reports, you are always
expected to put your best foot forward. People need
achievements.... So at times we didn't think of how you
measured success, we just thought of what our best foot
forward was. At times we were trying to show how many
dollars were saved in mediated case, rather then a court
case.1 7 9
Heightening the accountability challenges, volatile community conflicts
may spawn politically charged interference with funders.so Levine noted that
members of Congress sometimes called to ask why a federal official was
talking with "troublemakers."'' Reflecting this phenomenon more recently,
some blogs attacked CRS for instigating trouble in Sanford because CRS
officials mixed into crowds of demonstrators'82 though a local paper noted
that CRS mediators did so for demonstrations on all sides of the issues."'
In sum, accountability to those funding the interventions in polarized
conflicts always represents a challenge, and the need to do it complicates the
task of maintaining the climate and culture needed for effective intervention.
3. Resolving the Tensions Between Climate/Culture and Accountability
A few existing institutional approaches suggest several sound ways that
leaders could respond to Question Two, taking into account the tensions
between the need to be accountable and the desire to create a productive
climate and culture.
Having administrators handle accountability pressures while protecting
intervenors from these pressures: As Richard Salem suggested above
regarding putting the best foot forward, administrators could report to
funders according to criteria that the funder valued, while announcing
different criteria internally to set the expectations for intervenors and for the
179 Oral History Project, supra note 13: Richard Salem (2000).
180 See infra text accompanying notes 181-83.
181 LEVINE, supra note 13, at 237-40.
182 Katie Sanders, Judicial Watch Says Department of Justice Unit Organized
Protests Against George Zimmerman, POLITIFACT (Jul. 12, 2013, 4:18 PM)
http://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2013/jul/12/judicial-watch/judicial-watch-says-
department-justice-unit-organi/.
183 Id
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climate or culture of the office of intervenors. CRS administrators felt the
accountability pressures, as just discussed, but, interestingly, the intervenors
themselves seemed not to be bothered by them. Several former CRS
intervenors interviewed for an oral history project explained that they felt
supported in their work but never knew exactly how their performance was
being evaluated.184 A couple of intervenors mentioned that the number of
cases mattered to administrators in terms of counting them, but that
administrators did not seem to use the number of cases to judge their success.
As the result of this dichotomy, the intervenors did not feel pressures from
administrators to avoid delving into the root causes of the conflicts. 185
Similarly, administrators responded to political heat, but no intervenors
mentioned criticism from administrators for their doing their jobs in ways
that might generate controversy.'
Despite accountability pressures on CRS administrators, what Levine
described as CRS's culture fit the multiple roles intervenors described
above: 18 "a penchant for social justice and social action," "objectivity,
honesty, and fairness in guiding the process so that both parties in a conflict
would be able to negotiate," a concern that their work "make a difference,"
"flexibility," and commitment to formal training and informal exchanges on
methods to deal with "thorny problems." 1' While ideally outside
accountability standards would approximate the most productive inside
accountability, even CRS has not always been able to achieve that. It seems
unlikely that state and local level offices of intervenors will fare better than
CRS in creating the right internal climate by persuading those appropriating
funds to judge their success by criteria such as whether they dealt with root
causes of conflict, whether they were proactive and creative enough, or
whether their judgments in intervening were consistent with public policy.
When standards needed for accountability and climate orculture diverge,
reporting to funders using one set of criteria while evaluating intervenors
based on other criteria may satisfy funders while helping to preserve a
productive climate and culture, particularly if the leader of the larger agency
(such as the U.S. Attorney General for CRS) understands in some depth the
quality of the intervenors' contributions.
184 Oral History Project, supra note 13, especially at http://www.civilrightsmediation.
org/interviews (last visited Sept. 25, 2015) (nineteen former CRS intervenors were
interviewed).
" Oral History Project, supra note 13, especially at http://www.civilrightsmediation.
org/topics/2720.shtml (last visited Sept. 25, 2015).
18 6 Id.
11 7 See supra Section II, Subpart J.
188 LEVINE, supra note 13, at 237-40.
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Creating a single-purpose intervention agency: The leaders of public
agencies set up solely to intervene in polarized conflicts-such as a
specialized local community mediation program or a state-level public policy
mediation agency-would not have to differentiate the climate and culture
for the office of intervenors from that of a larger agency. The single purpose
agencies, though, may more often lack a powerful leader like the governor or
attorney general who can defend the budget, vouch for its value, and avoid
the numerical accountability measures so difficult for intervenors to meet
while doing their jobs in an effective way.189 As discussed below, community
mediation programs have suffered in public funds discussions, perhaps in
part for this reasoil.' 90 The single-purpose agency may be the best option in
some situations but may be too expensive for small communities where such
an agency's need would may not be constant, and, in any event, may not
work for long.
Finding an institutional home that has a compatible climate and culture:
One could argue that much about the U.S. Department of Justice climate and
culture is consistent with that of CRS, and that the same statement might
hold true for a state attorney general's office. As law offices, the attorney
general office administrators may encourage creativity, share the devotion to
justice, appreciate what would have occurred in a conflict absent
intervention, and understand that quality professional work often defies
numeric measure. 191
Many state attorney general offices differ from the Justice Department
though in a critical aspect. Most state attorneys general are elected,1 92 in
contrast to the U.S. Attorney General, who is appointed by the President
(subject to Senate confirmation).1 93 Some state attorneys general, as a result,
may be more concerned than the U.S. Attorney General about the political
consequences of intervening in volatile conflicts. Still, some attorneys
general would be willing to undertake the risks associated with intervening in
189 See Tim Hedeen & Patrick G. Coy, Community Mediation and the Court System:
The Ties That Bind, 17 MEDIATION Q. 351, 353-59 (2000) (noting tendency of
community programs to move closer to courts in order to receive funding and referrals
but then losing the culture that their founders envisioned).
'
90 See infra text accompanying note 269; see supra text accompanying notes 122-
23.
191 1 found this to be the case during my tenure as Ohio Attorney General in 2008-
2009.
192 NAT'L ASS'N OF ArrY's GEN., http://www.naag.org/naag/attorneys-general/whos-
my-ag.php (last visited Sept. 25, 2015) (listing 43 elected and 14 appointed attorneys
general for U.S. states, territories, and protectorates).
193 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
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raging conflict, and their offices offer a compatible culture for the
intervention work.
Similar questions might be raised for other agencies. For example,
universities might fare well in fostering a creative climate and culture but
poorly in valuing intervenors' contributions to the community as a whole as
opposed to the universities' teaching and research functions or to staff
interventions within the university.' 94 Those designing a university-based
office would need to alter the climate and culture for the offices of
intervenors. For example, a public agency might contract with universities
for the time of university-based intervenors for individual engagements, as
illustrated by several successful interventions discussed in this article,
relieving the professors of teaching and writing obligations for that period.' 95
Civil rights and equal opportunity offices that process individual
discrimination complaints might share concern for justice with the
intervenors, though processing individual complaints expeditiously might
take precedence over funding intervenors when administrators have to cut the
budget.
These examples illustrate how the designer for an office of intervenors
might create convergences between the productive climate and culture
needed for intervenors and for the overall public agency.
Contracting out the intervention: Occasionally a court can help provide
the needed local involvement when other state or local officials cannot figure
out a way to manage the tensions between accountability and creating the
necessary climate and culture. For example, in the aftermath of the 2001
Cincinnati riots following police shooting of an African-American youth,
U.S. District Judge Susan Dlott charged a special master mediator (whom she
had already appointed in a civil rights suit against the police) to engage
community representatives in planning changes in that community related to
racial justice, asking the parties to fund the intervention."'
The court did not intervene as quickly as Sanford officials though.' 97 By
the time the court mediation (pending before the shooting) turned to the
broader issues, Cincinnati had endured several days of demonstrations and
194 POLICY CONSENSUS INITIATIVE, FINDING BETTER WAYS TO SOLVE PUBLIC
PROBLEMS: THE EMERGING ROLE OF UNIVERSITIES AS NEUTRAL FORUMS FOR
COLLABORATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 5-6, 10-11 (2005) (most university-based programs
surveyed reported spending less than half of their time intervening in conflicts).
195 See supra text accompanying notes 145-52, 196-99; see infra text accompanying
notes 201-07 (discussions of the Snake River, Frostburg, and Cincinnati interventions).
196 See THE JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S. COMM. ON CT. ADMIN. AND CASE MGMT., CIVIL
LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL 84-85 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter Federal Litigation
Manual] (setting fees); FED. R. Civ. P. 53(g).
197 See supra text accompanying notes 26-34.
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rioting; injuries to demonstrators, police, and people driving by; and scores
of arrests.'" People's trust of and deference to the federal court resulted in
participation by all of those invited and, to the point of Question Two, there
was no indication of political interference in the process nor need to respond
to the court's case processing goals except to conclude relatively soon (they
reached agreement after nine months of discussions).'9 9
Contracting out the intervention-as in the Cincinnati federal court
intervention-may be the next best option for dealing with the climate and
culture challenge if a public agency cannot create a subculture for its office
in charge of intervening in polarized conflicts. Sometimes courts ask CRS
mediators to intervene, thereby using someone steeped in the climate and
culture of that office.200
Absent the CRS option, public officials may contract with a private
mediator. As with the story regarding Frostburg State,20 ' this may work out
effectively sometimes, though much will depend on the intervenor and the
details of the arrangement with the court, as the next story illustrates.
What appeared based on pleadings to be a legal dispute over water
rights had, just under the surface, the indicia of a polarized conflict. The
broader conflict involved treaties with Native American tribes regarding
fishing and water rights and strong resentments about what were perceived
as treaty breaches, as well as water claims related to the livelihood of others,
deeply-held environmental values, and more. Some parties characterized
these at the outset to be "intractable issues of principle. " 202 Francis
McGovern, then a University of Alabama law professor, mediated the
conflict for an Idaho court beginning in 1987. He had to persuade
constituencies that were not parties to the litigation to become engaged. In
order to maintain trust, the parties agreed that McGovern would not have ex
parte conversations with the judge, except about logistics.203
' Rothman (2006-2007), supra note 73, at 110, 127-28; Calm Urged after Rioting
in Cincinnati, Clergy Call for Peace after Youth's Killing, PHILLY.COM (Apr. 12, 2001),
http://articles.phiIly.com/2001-04-12/news/25332708_1 _black-men-black-youth-white-
police-officer.
'"Rothman (2006-2007), supra note 73, at 105-06, 127-28.
200 LEVINE, supra note 13, at 183-92. See Michael K. Lewis, The Special Master as
Mediator, 12 SETON HALL LEGIs. J. 75, 75-76 (1988); Paul Tractenberg, Court-
Appointed Mediators or Special Masters: A Commentary, 12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 81,
81-85 (1988) (regarding special masters).
201 See supra text accompanying notes 145-52.
202 McGovern, supra note 74, at 547-48, 562.
203 Id. at 558.
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The number of stakeholders was formidable so McGovern came up with
a novel process. He began with a small number of lawyers and then, after
reaching some tentative consensus among that group, expanded in
concentric circles until he had involved a broad number of constituencies on
the terms of an agreement.204 McGovern noted that the parties could, through
the settlement, "reconcile their philosophical and cultural differences in the
context of a pragmatic allocation of resources and management that satisfied
their respective needs. "205 The results, after six years of the process, included
federal and state legislation, about $200 million in federal funds, cooperative
management of water, and more.2 06
By appointing McGovern, the court may have incorporated a university
culture that favored the flexibility and creativity in thinking needed for such
an intervention. 207 The presence of related litigation and a judge willing to
take the initiative is not the norm, however. Further, agencies that contract
out all interventions may lack the knowledge and facility to intervene
proactively to deal with likely future conflicts. 2 08
These examples and the cautionary tale of court-annexed mediation
demonstrate the tensions between providing an ideal climate and culture for
intervenors and maintaining accountability for public funds. They also
underscore the importance of asking and answering Question Two; otherwise
the public agency may lose funding for the interventions or send out
ineffective intervenors.
C. Question Three: Will the office of intervenors juggle effectively the
sometimes competing tasks of (a) developing trust in the intervenor and the
process, (b) protecting the other roles played by that public agency, and (c)
providing the range of resources needed to succeed?
20 4 Id. at 562.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 559, 562.
207 See Nanci S. Klein, Community Mediation and the District Court-A
Collaboration That Is "Two Thumbs Up", 75 MICH. B.J. 158, 158-61 (1996) (for a
suggestion that courts accomplish something similar by referring to community
mediation programs).
208 Carlson & Anderson, supra note 120, at 13. ("Interviewees ... described how
agencies, in response to what they have learned from involvement of mediation, have
made operation changes, moving 'upstream' to try to resolve issues before they become
deeply entrenched disputes.... (OJver time, agency staff have started doing more and
more of this work themselves.").
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Each task that this section examines-developing trust, protecting other
roles, and providing a range of resources-has been critical to success in
some interventions into polarized conflicts,2 09 and yet strategies to implement
them sometimes conflict. A court, for example, may engender sufficient trust
and credibility to engage all stakeholders and may possess the authority to
impose costs on the parties. 210 If courts became primary providers of
intervention, though, some will express concern about whether these
activities will compromise the courts' role as adjudicators. 211 Also, as
discussed in the last section, the case resolution orientation of courts, as well
as the courts' concern about critiques of their long-term involvement in
supervising consent judgments, may work against continuing the intervention
long enough to assure implementation.2 12 To continue the court example, the
court may still be the best agency for managing a given intervention, but only
if the court walls off the negotiations from the judge assigned to decide the
cases arising out of the conflict and only if the court only selectively plays
this role.213
1. Developing Trust in the Intervenor or Intervention
CRS intervenors note that people-even people who distrust local
officials-tend to be willing to talk with intervenors who can say either that
they are Justice Department officials or that they come from CRS.2 14 As the
minister of a nearby community said about a CRS mediator in Sanford, "He
was able to get the largest group of pastors together, partly because his group
carried weight, representing the perspective of the Justice Department."2 15
Also, CRS officials use the time between crises to cultivate relationships
with city officials and pertinent groups within their regions. 216 As just
mentioned, when courts ask non-parties to participate, they too are often
successful, perhaps because people respect the neutrality and prestige.217
Local officials whom residents trust may also serve as effective convenors.218
209 See infra Subparts 1-3.
210 See supra text accompanying notes 196-99.
211 See infra text accompanying notes 241-54.
212 See supra text accompanying notes 155-59; see infra text accompanying notes
260-61.
213 See infra text accompanying notes 241-43.
214 See, e.g., Oral History Project, supra note 13.
215 Burch, supra note 29 (quoting Rev. Charles Holt of St. Peter's Episcopal Church
in Lake Mary). See supra text accompanying notes 26-34.
216 Telephone Interview with a CRS Mediator (Mar. 13, 2014).
217 See supra text accompanying note 210.
218 COLEMAN, supra note 10, at 14-18.
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Personal respect for a particular intervenor or a group of sponsors may have
similar results.2 19 Though a variety of approaches work, intervenors succeed
only if they find a way to engender trust and engagement.
The 1964 legislation establishing CRS included a provision that
separates CRS intervenors from law enforcement activities, providing
another advantage in gaining candid participation. The statute authorizing
CRS prohibits CRS officials from disclosing information from its
interventions to others outside CRS, including to colleagues within the
Justice Department. In fact, it is a crime for them to do so.220 Such a
provision encourages participation by those wary of the Justice Department's
investigatory arm. 221 Recognizing the role of confidentiality in engaging
reluctant parties, Grande Lum, its current director, is quick to point out that
CRS "does not have investigatory or enforcement authority" but rather
focuses on "crafting collaborative solutions that meet the underlying needs of
parties," and building trust with local leaders by maintaining confidentiality,
even with regard to others within the Department.2 22
Commentators have noted the contribution that cordoning the intervenors
from the managing agency's other roles makes in gaining trust. 223
Understanding this, intervenors "make do" when not protected by a statutory
provision such as that governing CRS. McGovern, the mediator in the Snake
River Basin case, 224 established confidentiality between the mediation and
the court by agreement.2 25 Sometimes a local civil rights agency has one staff
member intervene in polarized conflicts, with a practice that no information
219 James H. Laue, Getting to the Table: Creating the Forum for Negotiations in
Deep-Rooted Conflicts, 10 SoC. PRAC. 134, 140-46 (1992); Carpenter, 1999, supra note
13, at 61, 63; CARPENTER & KENNEDY, supra note 17, at 106. Regarding racial or ethnic
diversity of the intervenors and gaining trust in particular contexts, see generally
Liebman, supra note 96, at 273-74; PETER T. COLEMAN, supra note 70, at 142-43;
Stulberg, supra note 105, at 321.
220 42 U.S.C.S § 2000g-2 (2015).
221 2012 CRS Annual Report, supra note 45, at 34 ("CRS has no law enforcement
responsibilities; it does not investigate alleged violations of the law, nor does it prosecute
alleged law violators. CRS also conducts its work confidentially. As Justice Department
representatives, CRS mediators have the credibility and trust to work effectively with
people on all sides of the conflict.").
222 Profiles in ADR, supra note 30.
223 2004 Special Masters Conference: Transcript of Proceedings, 31 WM. MITCHEL
L. REv. 1193, 1198 (2004); Lewis, supra note 200, at 75; McGovern, supra note 74 at
547-48.
224 See supra text accompanying notes 201-07.
225 The Civil Litigation Management Manual recommends for federal litigation that
provisions regarding confidentiality be put in the order referring the case to a special
master for mediation. Federal Litigation Manual, supra note 196, at 86-87.
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passes to its investigation and hearing processes.22 6 These informal measures
may encourage candor and engagement in intervention processes, though, as
noted later, the lack of legal protection may occasionally render them
useless. 227
Involving potential participants in planning the process may be another
way to generate the needed trust and engagement for agencies that otherwise
would not have the respect that the public has for the courts, local officials,
U.S. Department of Justice, or the personal regard of well-known
intervenors. In the next story, private and state university actors combined
resources and involved local people in creating the process. They achieved
success in engaging a broad array of public officials and interest groups,
though with an ironic follow-up story.
The only physician in Catron County, New Mexico in 1995 noticed an
increase in depression, anxiety, family violence, and substance abuse and
attributed these increases to an escalating community-wide conflict.' What
had begun as a disagreement about logging and grazing on the federal lands
in this rural county had quickly turned bitter. 2 29 Environmental activists,
loggers, and ranchers sued the U.S. Forest Service, but that was only the
beginning.230 The county commissioners called for the arrest of any federal
official interfering with the "custom and culture of the people, " purported to
require "environmentalists" to "register with the county prior to doing any
assessments on land within the county borders, " and urged all households to
have a gun.2 3 1 Forest Service Rangers feared for their lives.
The physician sought help from a public health professor at the
University of New Mexico who suggested intervention by a nonprofit
community mediation center, the New Mexico Center for Dispute Resolution,
based in Albuquerque.2 32 The center's director asked the physician to identify
and convene a group representing the factions-roughly ranchers, loggers,
national environmental advocacy groups, the U.S. Forest Service, and local
government. These representatives respected the sincerity of the physician's
226 Telephone Interview with a CRS Mediator (Mar. 13, 2014).
227 See infra text accompanying notes 241-43.
228 Smith, supra note 83, at 985, 989.
229 Id. at 985-89.
2 3 0 Id. at 988.
231 Id. at 987-88.
232 Id. at 989.
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concern and neutral stance, and most came, though they later admitted that
they had little confidence that talking would produce anything of value."'
The University of New Mexico awarded a grant that permitted first the
Center and then outside mediators to facilitate talks over time. For six
months, members of the group explained their points of view to each other.
They then set up a process to engage even more stakeholders in discussing
their interests and developing options for achieving them.2 34
A year later, representatives of the diverse stakeholders were working
together, making progress where they could, and regularly talking through
differences. Two years later, they were ready to share their positive
experiences with other communities. The people of Catron County no longer
lived in fear of each other, and, in the view of the original intervenor, felt
pride and engagement in their community.235
The secrets to engaging the Catron County participants were, first, an
invitation from the physician they all trusted and, second, the participants'
involvement in creating the process. A community in Oregon used a similar
approach when federal officials limited logging on federal lands to protect
the northern spotted owl, with a respected local environmentalist convening
stakeholders at a potluck meal at his home and a participant-designed process
following that.236
Observing the Oregon community's success, the U.S. Department of
Interior tried to replicate that success in ten other counties with spotted owls
and logging on federal lands.237 It copied the stakeholder groups from the
233 Id. The national environmental groups, though, resisted at various times,
concerned that their participation in a consensus-building process might reduce the
pressures for increased environmental enforcement. Id. at 995:
234 Additional foundations provided the help to continue the process. The U.S.
Department of Agriculture made experts available to help all groups understand the
scientific basis for environmental concerns. The Department also provided a mediator to
produce consensus on some specific issues. Id. at 993-99, 1007.
235 See Sam Bums, Catron County, New Mexico: Mirroring the West, Healing and
Rebuilding Community, in FOREST COMMUNITIES, COMMUNITY FORESTs: STRUGGLES
AND SUCCESSES IN REBUILDING COMMUNITIES AND FORESTS 89, 114 (Jonathan Kusel &
Elisa Adler eds., 2003) (author comes to a similar conclusion about the success of the
intervention in Catron County).
236 Chris Carlson, Convening, in THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT 169, 172-73 (Lawrence Susskind et
al. eds., 1999).
23 Christine Carlson suggests that the problem was not that the federal government
convened the stakeholders but that the government did not go through the initial steps of
collaborative design with stakeholders so the stakeholders were worried about such
things as "the federal government's motives, the balance of power at the table and the
224
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successful intervention and contracted with outside mediators. 23 8 But, by one
account, all ten of these interventions floundered because people attended a
few meetings and then quit participating. 2 39 According to an experienced
mediator, those invited had not been involved in the design; they did not trust
or feel committed to the process. 240
In other words, many paths might lead to this trust and engagement, but
the designer for the office of intervenors should make certain that its
combination works. Otherwise, no meaningful consensus will result.
2. Protecting the Public Agency's Other Roles
Those public agencies that might be most attractive in terms of gaining
stakeholders' trust may also be agencies whose other roles might be
compromised if they administer interventions in polarized conflicts. The
risks might include transmission of information that otherwise would not be
considered by decision-makers, bias as the result of investment in the success
of the intervention, loss of public confidence in the agency, and distraction.
Confidentiality with regard to an agency's other roles, considered in the
last section as a means to gain confidence of stakeholders, may also avoid
biasing decision-makers in their enforcement or judicial functions.24 1 By
keeping from judges or prosecutors what intervenors learn from stakeholders,
for example, one avoids familiarizing them with facts that might bias, or be
viewed as biasing, future rulings or decisions. To be effective in this context,
though, planners may need to establish confidentiality by law, as Congress
did in the statute establishing CRS.242 Otherwise, the courts may enforce
subpoenas that require disclosures of information that the intervenors hoped
would be held confidentially.2 43
availability of resources to enable all groups to participate on an equal footing." She cites
to B. KenCairn, The Partnership Phenomenon, 3 CHRONICLE OF COMMUNITY 37, 37-41
(1997). Carlson, supra note 236, at 172-73.
238 Carlson, supra note 236, at 172-73.
239 Id
240 d
241 ROBERT J. NIEMIC, DONNA STIENSTRA & RANDALL E. RAVITZ, GUIDE TO JUDICIAL
MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR § X (Federal Judicial Center 2001); Federal Litigation
Manual, supra note 196, at 86, 157-59 (recommending that the referral order provide
"instructions regarding confidentiality of the proceedings and communications between
the judge and the neutral").
242 42 U.S.C.S § 2000g-2 (2015).
243 1 COLE ET AL., supra note 62 §§ 8:37-8:39 ("Agreements not to disclose,
subpoena, or offer in evidence information conveyed during a mediation do not
necessarily fully protect information from disclosure. Courts sometimes view such
225
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Protecting a public agency's other roles also includes preserving public
regard for that agency. The selection of a neutral, for example, may need to
be transparent and seem fair in order to avoid public perceptions of
cronyism.244 For this reason, the Maryland court program had intervenors on
retainer who could act quickly when necessary, but with the further provision
that they be replaced as soon as feasible by intervenors selected through a
public bidding process. 2 45 Though this means that two intervenors must learn
about the local situation and develop trust, preserving public confidence may
be worth the added expense. And the sequential intervenors may still cost
less than a staff model in which intervenors do not have enough work to
remain busy.
Another aspect of public regard may be more difficult to manage,
however. Court-appointed intervenors could arguably undermine public
confidence in a court's neutrality if "courts are constantly drawn into and
then quartered over intensely difficult political issues" according to one court
expert.246 If courts decided that he is right, courts might decide to stay out of
the most volatile disputes-arguably those in which intervention matters
most.
In the case of the courts, scholars also argue that a judge focused on
managing collaborative processes will favor one party in unreviewable ways,
will pressure parties to accept less than they could achieve through litigation,
will be distracted from adjudicative functions and therefore less effective as
adjudicators, and will be partial in making rulings (including rulings in the
case involving the intervention if the judge becomes invested in the success
of the intervention).247 Others add that the public will be confused about the
agreements as attempts to suppress evidence making the agreements void as against
public policy." § 8:37. Protective orders providing for confidentiality may sometimes be
set aside. § 8:34.).
24 Federal Litigation Manual, supra note 196, at 84-88; Sandra S. Beckwith,
District Court Mediation Programs: A View from the Bench, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 357, 360-61 (2011) (regarding court-appointed mediators); Peter W. Agnes, Jr., A
Reform Agenda for Court-Connected Dispute Resolution in Massachusetts, 40-Apr
BOSTON B.J. 4 (1996) (noting potential problems and suggesting remedies).
245 See supra text accompanying note 150.
246 ALEXANDER B. AIKMAN, THE ART AND PRACTICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION 77
(2007).
247 Fiss, supra note 140, at 1277 ("Sometimes judges step in and try to facilitate the
bargaining process and thus encourage settlement; sometimes they even insist upon it.");
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374, 424-31 (1982); Judith Resnik,
Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHICAGO L. REv. 494, 536-39
(1986); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, Jeremy Bentham and the Privatization of
Adjudication, 49 SUP. CT. L. REv. 2D 205, 211-12 (2010); Judith Resnik, Many Doors?
Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP.
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judges' roles, 248 especially as the judges interpret and enforce consent
decrees that include relief that the court might not have provided in a
decision on the merits249 or assume oversight of local government functions
like schools or prisons.2 50
Still other commentators disagree that these concerns merit ousting the
courts as sponsors for collaborative processes.2 51 In their view, lawyers
believe that judges work more effectively when they actively manage their
cases. 25 2 They also point out that sponsoring collaborative procedures does
RESOL. 211, 260-62 (1995). Cf Paul M. Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism and
Institutional Debiasing Strategies, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 373, 408 (2012) (dealing with
specialty courts).
248 Fiss, supra note 140, at 1280 ("Judges are judges, not brokers of deals, and I fear
that a too-ready acquiescence in the directives of those who want them to behave
otherwise will-not in a day, but over time-diminish their authority in the eyes of the
community.").
249 Alan Effron, Federalism and Federal Consent Decrees Against State
Governmental Entities, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1797, 1810 (1988) ("The Supreme Court has
thus given its imprimatur to the notion that the remedial relief embodied in a consent
decree may go significantly beyond what a federal court could itself order upon the
merits."); Cf David I. Levine, The Modification of Equitable Decrees in Institutional
Reform Litigation: A Commentary of the Supreme Court's Adoption of the Second
Circuit's Flexible Test, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1239, 1239-40 (1993); Timothy Stoltzfus
Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification ofInjunctions in the Federal Courts,
64 TEx. L. REV. 1101, 1161-62 (1986) ("Modification decisions [for decrees, including
consent decrees] are, therefore, idiosyncratic. Yet, principled consideration of
modification motions is necessary if those decisions are to be legitimate...").
250 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) (1997) (providing for prison consent decrees
or certain other injunctions to terminate within two years absent special findings for
continuation); Philip B. Kurland, "Brown v. Board of Education Was the Beginning":
The School Desegregation Cases in the United States Supreme Court: 1954-1979, 1979
WASH. U. L.Q. 309.
251 Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE
L.J. 669, 688 (2010) ("[T]he recent survey data give welcome cause for hope that the
path [regarding case management] we have pursued for the last thirty years has not been
one giant misstep and may even have been the right step."); Michael Moffitt, Three
Things to Be Against ("Settlement" Not Included), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1245
(2009) ("If Against Settlement means what its language implies-that one could do away
with settlement, retain litigation, and be better off for the change-then the article's thesis
is flawed both as a theoretical and as a practical matter."); Sturm & Gadlin, supra note
141, at 52; Jack B. Weinstein, Comments on Owen M Fiss, Against Settlement (1984), 78
FoRDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1272 (2009) ("Exercise of sound judgment by administrative
agencies, lawyers, corporations, and individual litigants in the criminal and civil justice
systems is required to find the right mix of settlements and trials in the many distinctive
disputes that our contemporary complex society produces.").
252 Gensler, supra note 251, at 681.
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not undermine confidence in the justice system if intervenors maintain
neutrality (perhaps including some distance between judges and intervenors),
do what is promised in a way that the public can understand, allow people to
express their views, and "respect" people and their rights. 25 3 In fact, the
public sometimes approves of a court that becomes involved in solving the
community's problems.2 54
In particular contexts, this theoretical debate might play out differently.
For example, if people already distrust the way that a court is trying
protestors, the public might think it inappropriate for the court to oversee an
intervention in the larger, community-wide conflict.
Of course, a single-purpose organization avoids some of these mixed role
dilemmas. A public funder might award a grant to intervene in polarized
conflicts, for example, to a nonprofit local community mediation program
(like the New Mexico center just discussed).255 While avoiding harm to the
public agency's role, the single-purpose agency lacks the public recognition
of larger agencies like an attorney general's office or court, thus perhaps
compromising the intervenors' abilities to engage participants, the focus of
subpart 1. In short, single-purpose agencies pose no role dilemmas, but create
other problems at times. It becomes critical for this reason that those
designing offices of intervenors learn to deal with the mixed roles and
climates or cultures of larger public agencies.
3. Accommodating Extensive, Long-Term, and Changing Needs for
Resources
Consider the length of involvement in each of these stories: two years
and counting in Sanford,256 Catron County,257 and Frostburg258 and six years
for the Snake River Basin.259 The Cincinnati court mediation concluded more
253 KEVIN BURKE & STEVE LEBEN, PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS: A KEY INGREDIENT IN
PUBLIC SATISFACTION 6, 9 (2007) (American Judges Association 2007) (after problem-
solving courts were started, the public's outlook toward the court improved.); Rebecca
Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Rule of Law: Fostering
Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 3 (2011).
254 Burke & Leben, supra note 253, at 9 (reporting that the percentage of the
Brooklyn public's positive outlook toward the courts increased from 57% to 78% in the
first two years of operation of a problem-solving court docket in which judges work with
defendants as they use community organizations to turn around their lives).
255 See supra text accompanying notes 228-35.
256 See supra text accompanying notes 26-34.
257 See supra text accompanying notes 228-35.
258 See supra text accompanying notes 145-51.
259 See supra text accompanying notes 201-07.
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quickly (nine months),26 0 but the mediator noted that as a shortcoming in
achieving long-term solutions. One of the problems of "parachuting in," he
said, and then leaving Cincinnati was that there was no re-connection with
those who participated and no continuing group to deal with emerging
problems, no "institutional memory," and no "internal ownership of the
process."261 The intervention may extend beyond the anticipated schedule
because of changes in political leadership or other unanticipated
developments.262 The long-term nature and unpredictability of the timeframe
may confound agency budget planning.
The changeable nature of the intervention heightens budget planning
difficulties, as the conflict intervention often evolves to require space,
educational resources, experts, and more.263 In the stories in this article,
public officials found experienced and able intervenors, but that, too, may
become a resource issue if more state and local communities begin to use
intervenors on a wider scale.
Unfortunately, public funding for interventions in polarized conflicts
seems especially vulnerable to cuts, 264 posing the possibility that an
intervenor will have to leave in the midst of the task. Ironically, the public
agencies best able to garner funders' respect and therefore the leeway to use
resources flexibly, such as the courts or attorney general offices,265 may cut
their intervention functions first in a budget crisis. 2 6 6 By analogy, in times of
budget cuts, mediation programs for legal disputes reported pressures to
produce high settlement rates and reduce time per mediation, and threats to
cut all funding because mediation does not fall within the "core" of the
court's mission.2 67 Court-funded intervention programs such as Maryland's
MACRO (as opposed to court- ordered interventions that parties fund) may
260 Rothman (2012), supra note 73, at 199.
261 Id. at 199-200. See also Matz, supra note 101, at 20.
262 Potapchuk & Crocker, supra note 85, at 551-53.
263 Carpenter, 1999, supra note 13, at 61, 97.
264 Carlson & Anderson, supra note 120, at 15-16.
265 Christine Carlson & Sanford M. Jaffe, Statewide Offices - The Experts' Views, in
STATEWIDE OFFICES OF MEDIATION: EXPERIMENTS IN PUBLIC POLICY 5, 11 (National
Institute for Dispute Resolution Forum 1987) ("By working with the state court systems,
the state offices gamer an additional degree of legitimacy and credibility."). See supra
discussion accompanying notes 178-79 (regarding U.S. Attorney General).
266 Welsh, supra note 166, at 878 (noting the irony that mediation proponents want
to take advantage of the courts' prestige while avoiding some of the implications of doing
so). See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 171, at 443 (reporting that a number of
California courts terminated funding for mediation programs in 2012 when courts had to
cut spending).
267 Welsh, supra note 266, at 879.
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become susceptible in budget cutting to the argument that they are not
"mission critical"--not "essential for the proper operation of the court, both
to fulfill its adjudicative role and to be a viable branch of government." 2 68
Similar financial pressures affect agencies set up primarily to intervene. 2 69
Even the New Mexico center that managed the Catron County intervention
ran out of money and closed.2 70
In other words, funding issues become a counterweight at times to the
ideal ways to combine public values and practical decision-making (Question
One), desires to set the right climate and culture (Questions Two), and efforts
to secure requisite trust and engagement and to protect the agency's other
roles (Question Three). Those who decide whether to intervene and how to
shape the intervention should be realistic about whether they can marshal the
resources to do so effectively. Asking the three questions with a sober
assessment of resources will aid in achieving that.
IV. CONCLUSION
One could conclude with a pessimistic assessment (though I do not):
states and localities lack the political will to institutionalize the capacity for
experienced intervenors to help local communities deal constructively with
polarized conflict. That was sociologist James Coleman's take on the
situation in 1957 after reviewing decades of studies of communities under
stress. 271 "Each community," Coleman said, deals with these conflicts "as if
similar problems had never arisen elsewhere. Each community carries out for
itself a trial and error process without benefit of the cumulative experience of
other communities."2 72 Reviewing failures to apply cumulative experience
and the consequences for those communities, Coleman warns that the effects
of local community's errors spread beyond the specific incident-they
"[load] the dice in favor of a similar outcome the next time." 27 3
Giving reason for a more optimistic assessment, the creation of CRS in
1964 represented a shift from that approach.274 Congress recognized that
268 ALEXANDER B. AIKMAN, THE ART AND PRACTICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION
211 (2007).
269 See supra text accompanying notes 228-35; Amsler, supra note 122, at 6 ("[T]he
field's community sector is pressed by a lack of financial stability and challenges to its
own set of values."); Corbett & Corbett, supra note 122, at 458-59.
270 See supra text accompanying notes 228-35.
271 COLEMAN, supra note 10, at 4-5.
272 Id. at 2.
27 31 d. at 2.
274 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000g-1 (2015).
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federal intervenors supplemented in valuable ways the crucial roles played
by law enforcement and by changes in law.
The use of state or local intervenors in Sanford, Florida and in the article's
other stories may herald yet another shift. 275 As these stories illustrate,
experienced state and local intervenors bring the cumulative lessons from other
polarized communities and can make the difference between a community that
solves problems and becomes resilient and one that explodes each time than an
incident illuminates its divisions. 276 When experienced and organized
effectively, state and local intervenors can give immediate and trusted counsel
to local officials, help them understand that CRS intervenors bring the valuable
cumulative experience of intervening in other polarized communities, augment
CRS intervenors, and take on CRS's role when it cannot be there. In addition,
state and local intervenors stay on to re-build relationships, help the community
create structures for to solve the problem illuminated by the trigger incident,
and sow seeds to prevent future issues from polarizing the community. They
may make that difference even in those jurisdictions that fund the interventions
only for a time,277 as long as these intervenors have the resources and structure
to intervene in a particular conflict in ways that are effective and consistent with
public policy.
The article ends where it began-effective institutionalization at the
state or local level for intervenors in polarized conflict matters but it requires
more than money. Positive markers in achieving that success, which form the
basis for the three questions suggested by this article, include, first, decision-
making about when and how to intervene by public officials informed by
feasibility; second, a hospitable work climate and culture for the intervenors
and a workable approach to accountability to funders that does not
undermine creation of a hospitable climate and culture; and, third, the ability
to engender trust and engagement in the midst of an emotional and divided
community, protection of the administering agency's other roles, and
flexibility in providing resources.2 78 The article's three questions reflect these
markers and represent "off-the-shelf' guidance as state or local officials
begin planning, sometimes anew, to develop the critical capacity to intervene
in polarized community conflict. Stories like Ferguson's,2 79 Sanford's,28 0
275 See supra text accompanying notes 26-34.
276 Supra Part II.
277 Supra Part III
278 Supra Part III.
279 See supra text accompanying notes 1-8.
280 See supra text accompanying notes 26-34.
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Catron County's,2 8 ' Frostburg's,28 2 and the Snake River Basin's2 83 occur
frequently and bring to life the urgency of getting the answers right.
281 See supra text accompanying notes 228-35.
282 See supra text accompanying notes 145-51.
283 See supra text accompanying notes 201-07.
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